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The growing demand for earth-orbiting satellite communication
systems in the marketplace' foreshadows a burgeoning world revolu-
tion in wireless telecommunications.2 These commercial space ven-
tures offer substantial economic benefits, particularly for the United
States satellite industry-the world leader in satellite-related tech-
nologies. But just as the potential revenues from these space-based
1. See Activate the Money Star: Satellite Operators: Suddenly Everybody is
Ordering Satellites Again. It Marks a Big Gamble on Consumer's Passion for
Television and the Internet, ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997 (stating that the ambitious
plans for satellite telecommunications services are resulting in an unprecedented
number of applications for orbital slots and user licenses).
2. See John Verity, What's Hot? Anything Connected with networking Inter-
net Technology, Electronic Commerce, Networking and Wireless Communication
Lead The Pack, COMPWORLD, Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7735976 (de-
scribing a number of developing space-based telecommunication systems which
"will flood any spot on the earth's surface with megabits of data per second.").
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telecommunication systems begins to unfold,3 there remains a central
question facing investors: can the space launch services4 industry
meet satellite launch demands?
The United States and Europe are the world leaders in the com-
mercial space launch services market.5 These Western launch service
providers supply most of the world's satellite launch services;6 how-
ever, market forces are placing increased incentives on satellite com-
panies to contract with non-Western launch services based in non-
market economy nations. As a result, the interests of the commercial
satellite industry conflict with United States policies restricting par-
ticipation of non-market economy launch services in the satellite
launch market. These governmental policies are set forth in three bi-
lateral Space Launch Services Trade Agreements (launch agree-
ments) between the United States and the Russian Federation,'
Ukraine,' and the People's Republic of China.9 The launch agree-
3. See Theresa Foley, Pie in the Sky?, COMMWI, December 16, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 8647456 (citing a report from a New York investment bank pre-
dicting revenues in the satellite communications business to triple by the year
2000).
4. "Space launch services" refers to the commercial entities which provide
the service of launching and placing satellites into earth orbit using space launch
vehicles (e.g. expendable rockets).
5. See Radmir Smirnov, Redivision Of Space Market For The Benefit Of Rus-
sia Expected Early Next Century, BiziKON NEWS, Aug. 13, 1996, available in
1996 WL 6462719 (noting that the United States and European Union dominate
the market).
6. See Established Launchers Record Banner Year in 1996, SPACE BUS.
NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8214951 (stating that by late 1996 there
were twenty-four commercial satellite launches, with the United States companies
launching eleven, European Union (EU) launching nine, and Russia and China
each launching two. Thus, the United States and the EU launched 83% of all
commercial satellites in 1996).
7. See Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of The Russian Federation Regarding International Trade In
Commercial Space Launch Services, September 2, 1993, State Dept. No. 93-177,
available in 1993 WL 444618 [hereinafter 1993 Russia Trade Agreement];
Agreement Between The United States And Russia Amending The Agreement Of
September 2, 1993, Regarding International Trade In Commercial Launch Serv-
ices, January 30, 1996, State Dept. No. 96-37, available in 1996 WL 163957
[hereinafter 1996 Russia Amendment].
8. See Agreement Between The Government of The United States of America
and The Government of Ukraine Regarding International Trade in Commercial
Launch Services, February 21, 1996, State Dept. No. 96-51, available in 1996 VL
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ments set forth policies designed to accommodate the needs of the
satellite industry, promote economic reform in non-market econo-
mies, and minimize disruption to the United States space launch
services marketplace. 0
On September 19, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced
that at the expiration of the three launch agreements, the United
States will replace "negotiated trade" in commercial launch services
with a "trade environment characterized by the free and open inter-
action of market economies."' 1 The 1996 Space Policy announce-
ment reflects a rapidly expanding commercial environment that has
begun to convince policymakers that negotiated trade in space launch
services has outlived its usefulness. The existing trade agreements
expire at the end of 2001.12 The question is, what type of market-
oriented trading environment will best further United States interests
in expanding markets in space after 2001?
Both the launch services industry and the satellite industry criti-
cize the bilateral space launch agreements, but for different reasons.
The Clinton administration now faces the challenge of developing a
strategy to accommodate these often-diverging business interests.
This Comment hopes to set forth a clearer understanding of the
regulatory and commercial aspects of this marketplace and in doing
so will reach the conclusion that market forces are an effective con-
trol on launch suppliers transitioning to market-orientated trade
practices. Moreover, this Comment suggests that recent events in the
marketplace offer new opportunities for reaching a multilateral trad-
ing consensus.
195515 [hereinafter 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement].
9. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Re-
garding Trade in Commercial Launch Services, March 13, 1995 [hereinafter 1995
China Agreement] (manuscript on file with author).
10. These market-orientated goals of the launch agreements with China, Rus-
sia, and Ukraine are the focus of this piece. For further discussion of these issues,
see Part III.B infra.
11. See Satellite Diary, SATELLITE WK., Sept. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL
7055404.
12. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. VIII; 1996 Ukraine
Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. VIII; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9,
art. VIII.
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Part I presents a brief overview of the legal, economic, and politi-
cal factors influencing the space launch services market since the
early 1980s. The discussion focuses on the legislation implementing
the United States commercial launch services industry, the issues
surrounding entry into the marketplace by the People's Republic of
China (China) and the launch suppliers of the former Soviet Union,
and the failed attempt at reaching a multilateral trade agreement with
the European Community. Part II describes the nature of the com-
mercial space launch business, including the market and non-market
factors that affect competitiveness and place special demands on
launch service providers.
Part III analyzes each launch agreement. This part includes a dis-
cussion of the administrative aspects of the agreements, the ap-
proaches taken to deal with market uncertainties, and the differences
between United States trade agreements with the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, and China. The discussion then turns to the current debate
over whether the agreements adequately provide for the needs of the
satellite industry while ensuring a fair trading environment in space
launch services.
Part IV highlights current trends in the marketplace and concludes
that these market trends provide a strong argument for relaxing the
quota-based restrictions on non-market economy service providers.
Furthermore, Part IV suggests that a maturing space launch services
marketplace is providing a realistic means for nations to begin
reaching a consensus on multilateral trading rules.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SHAPING THE
COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES MARKET:
1984-1996
A. THE 1984 COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT AND 1988
AMENDMENTS
The early 1980s marked the beginning of the commercial launch
services market.13 Until 1986, there were really only two players: 4
13. See NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, SPACE POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 129 (1992).
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the United States, marketing the Space Shuttle, 5 and a European en-
tity known as Arianespace, marketing the Ariane space launch vehi-
cle. 16 In 1984, Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act as
a means for encouraging private investment in the launch services
industry. 7 The 1984 Act announced a strong United States policy
interest in the development of a governmental infrastructure 8 for
supporting private investment in a space launch services industry. 9
Congress's interest in supporting a commercial launch services in-
dustry has not faded in recent years.20
By passing the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments (the
1988 Amendments), Congress affirmed the policy supporting private
investment in commercial launch services.2 After the 1986 Space
Shuttle Challenger explosion, the United States decided that all
commercial launches would be handed over to private rocket firms.22
14. See Marcia S. Smith, Space Launch Services- The Competitive Playing
Field: A Primer, at 3 (Cong. Res. Service, 1992) (noting that customers could use
either NASA's Space Shuttle or Europe's Ariane for commercial satellite
launches).
15. See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 127-28.
16. See id. at 34, 136.
17. See Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575, §§ 2-3,
98 Stat. 3055 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 70101 (1994)). For a detailed
analysis of the 1984 Act, see Kim G. Yelton, Evolution, Organization and Imple-
mentation of The Commercial Launch Act and Amendments of 1988, 4 J.L. &
TECH. 117 (1989).
18. See Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 3, 98 Stat. 3055 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
70101(b)) (stating that the purposes of the Act are to establish a regulatory author-
ity for issuing licenses and facilitate the use of government launch facilities). Gov-
ernment oversight in space launch services was vested in the Secretary of the De-
partment of Transportation. See Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 3055 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 70103).
19. See 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(9). Congress found that "the participation of
State governments in encouraging and facilitating private sector involvement in
space-related activity, particularly through the establishment of a space transporta-
tion-related infrastructure ... is in the national interest and is of significant public
benefit." Id.
20. See David P. Radzanowski & Marcia S. Smith, Space Launch Vehicles:
Government Requirements and Commercial Competition, 14 (Cong. Res. Service,
1997) (citing recent legislative initiatives that would further promote the space
launch services industry).
21. See Pub. L. No. 100-657, 102 Stat. 3900 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 70101-70301 (1994)).
22. See Exec. Order No. 12546, reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2465(f)
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This policy change, combined with a need to supplement the provi-
sions in the 1984 Act, led to the passage of the 1988 Amendments.
3
The 1988 Amendments revisited issues of launch vehicle liability in-
surance,24 government launch facility costs, and investments in
launch vehicles.2 In addition, the 1988 Amendments issued an en-
dorsement of trade negotiations that would provide the incentives for
United States launch service providers to compete in a world mar-
ket.2
6
The 1984 and 1988 Acts are strong policy statements issued on
behalf of a commercial industry whose annual revenue is, even to
this day, rather small in comparison to other industries.27 These poli-
cies are justified, however, because a space launch capability is a
(1994) (restricting the use of the Space Shuttle).
23. See generally S. REP. No. 100-593 (1988) (noting that the 1988 Amend-
ments are intended to facilitate satellite transfers from the shuttle launch manifest
and to further encourage the development of a competitive United States launch
industry). The 1988 Amendments provided the financial means for United States
launch service providers to begin competing against Arianespace. See Jon C. Gar-
cia, Heaven or Hell: The Future of The United States Launch Services Industry, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 335-37 (1994) (recognizing that the 1988 Amendments
persuaded the United States launch industry to enter the commercial launch serv-
ices market).
24. See 49 U.S.C. § 70112(a) (1994) (outlining a three-tier system of liability
and placing a ceiling on potential liability to property, government facilities, and
foreign countries); 49 U.S.C. § 70113(a) (describing the method of paying claims
arising from launch vehicle liability). Insurance for space launches in the 1980s
exceeded underwriter capacity. See generally S. REP. No. 100-593 (stating that the
United States launch industry cannot enter into a commercial environment without
limiting potential liability for launch vehicle use). Prior to commercial launches,
the government shouldered all costs. See id. After the 1984 Act, however, it be-
came apparent that there were no underwriters willing to insure launch vehicles
except at extremely high rates. See Garcia, supra note 23, at 373.
25. See 49 U.S.C. § 70301(a) (1994) (describing the means of improving ac-
cess to space through matching grants, research in launch vehicle technologies,
and the development of launch facilities).
26. See 49 U.S.C. § 70117(e) (1994) (encouraging dialogue between the
United States and foreign competitors in establishing fair trading practices in
commercial launch services).
27. See generally Industry Opposition to US.-Imposed Launch Quotas Grows
as Launch Demand Soars, MOBILE SATELLrrE NEWS, Feb. 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8299037 (stating that satellite industry revenues, which historically
range between one and two billion dollars per year, roughly double the annual
revenues of the commercial launch vehicle industry).
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symbol of national prestige and political power;" it allows a nation's
national security establishments to draw from resources developed in
the private sector and offset government investment costs through
commercial sales,29 and it gives a nation direct access to space. 30
Thus, the economic assessment of investing in a commercial space
transportation system stretches well beyond a traditional wealth-
maximization analysis. A proper assessment of a nation's interest in
investing in space launch vehicles must also consider factors which
tend to blur "traditional boundary lines... [separating] national se-
curity, foreign policy, and economic policy" interests.3'
B. THE 1989 AND 1995 SPACE LAUNCH AGREEMENTS WITH
CHINA
China announced its intentions to enter the commercial launch
market in 1985.32 The state-subsidized company, Great Wall Indus-
trial Corporation (GWIC), markets the Chinese launch vehicle
known as Long March.33 On 17 December 1988, the United States
28. See Henry R. Hertzfeld, Who's Who in Outer Space, USA TODAY, July 1,
1994, available in 1994 WL 13637963.
29. See Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations For Fiscal
Year 1996 And The Future Years Defense Program, Space Programs and the De-
partment of Defense's Space Management Initiative: Hearings Before the Comm.
On Armed Services United States Senate, 104th Cong. 387, 180 (1995) [hereinafter
Military Space Power] (testimony of Dr. Scott Pace, Policy Analyst, Critical
Technologies Institute, The Rand Corp.) (describing how the United States na-
tional security interests would be served by a robust commercial space launch in-
dustry). Notwithstanding the technological benefits and government cost offsets
arising from private investment and sales in commercial launch services, the mili-
tary would benefit from a reserve fleet of space launch vehicles in a time of crisis.
See id.
30. See ME-I: Japan's Space Programme, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 12, 1994, avail-
able in 1994 WL 12757334 (stating that Japan incurred the enormous expense of
developing its own space transportation system in order to end its dependence on
foreign launch vehicles).
31. Military Space Power, supra note 29, at 182 (statement of Dr. Scott Pace,
Policy Analyst, Critical Technologies Institute, The Rand Corp.).
32. See Global Trade in Satellites and Launch Services: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Space of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Tech., 103d Cong.
121 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Global Trade Hearing] (testimony of Donald Phil-
lips, Ass't United States Trade Rep. for Industry) (discussing China's authorization
of GWIC to market commercial launch services).
33. See id.
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Trade Representative (USTR) and China initialed three separate
agreements allowing for the export and launch of three United States
satellites.3 4 China's ascension into the Western satellite launch serv-
ices market was contingent on agreements to abide by rules govern-
ing safeguards on technology transfers,35 assigning liability in the
event of a launch failure,36 and engaging in fair trade.37 Final export
approval was vested in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM). 3"
The 1989 China Agreement was an opportunity for the United
States to establish trading rules early, while it still held the upper
hand in the market. Since the United States dominated the satellite
market, it could dictate the terms under which any nation wishing to
34. See State Department Regular Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 19, 1988,
available in NEXIS, Markets library, ALLNWS file.
35. See Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology Safeguards, De-
cember 17, 1988, U.S.-P.R.C., State Dept. 89-114 (enforced March 16, 1989)
[hereinafter 1989 China Tech Tran Agreement].
36. See Memorandum of Agreement on Liability for Satellite Launches, De-
cember 17, 1988, U.S.-P.R.C., State Dept. 89-115 (enforced March 16, 1989)
[hereinafter 1989 China Liability Agreement]. For any joint space venture, the
United States is potentially liable for any damage caused by a space launch or an
orbiting body. See idt art III. This international obligation on the United States is
founded on agreements set forth in 1972. See Convention on International Liabil-
ity for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (en-
tered into force Sept. 1, 1972). The 1989 China Liability Agreement requires
China to promptly become a member of 1972 liability convention and assume full
financial responsibility for any claims made against the United States. See 1989
China Liability Agreement, supra, art. I.
37. See Memorandum of Agreement Regarding International Trade in Com-
mercial Launch Services, January 26, 1989, United States-P.R.C., State Dept. 89-
116 (enforced March 16, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 China Agreement].
38. See COCOM Decision in Jan.: China Meets Final U.S. Condition for Long
March Launches, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 20, 1988, available in NEXIS, NEWS li-
brary (noting that the agreement does not limit the power of the United States to
issue export licenses). COCOM is an informal organization whose purpose is to
bring into agreement all export controls against the former Soviet Union, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, and the Warsaw Pact Nations. See Zachary S. Davis, et.
al., Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, at 26 (Cong. Res. Ser.,
1992). COCOM was disbanded in March of 1994 and has since been replaced by a
new multilateral export control regime. See The Wassenaar Arrangement for Ex-
port Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
August 1, 1996 (listing dual-use goods which include missile related technolo-
gies).
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enter into the launch services market could do so.39 The agreement
also afforded United States satellite makers an opportunity to market
satellites in China in exchange for launch contracts with Chinese
launch vehicles.40 Despite protests by Western launch service provid-
ers,4 the agreement's terms were viewed as the best approach to
avoid market disruption by China and expand United States mar-
kets.42
The 1989 China agreement placed specified limits on China's
market share in the industry.4" But the limits imposed by the trade
agreement were not the only obstacle facing China. Political events
also served to limit China's entry into the launch services market.44
39. See Washington Space Business Roundtable Regarding Launching U.S.
Satellites Aboard The Chinese Long March Launch Vehicle, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 12, 1988, available in NEXIS, NEWS library [hereinafter 1988 Space
Roundtable] (statement of Eugene McCallister, Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic and Business Affairs) (stating that by issuing licenses for United States
made satellites, the United States could establish a framework for the market-
place).
40. See id. (arguing that "by accepting these licenses, we have an opportunity
to engage the Chinese").
41. See id. Some satellite industry representatives viewed China's entry into
the launch vehicle business as a prerequisite for trade with China. See id. In con-
trast, many in the launch vehicle industry viewed China's entry as disruptive to the
market. See id. Launch service industry criticism of China's perceived predatory
trade practices continued in later years. See Smith, supra note 14, at 4; see also
Augustine: U.S. Companies Face Challenge of 'One World' Economy, AEROSPACE
DAILY, May 26, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2170186 (outlining three "degrees of
'unlevel playing fields' in the launch services competition with non-market
economies); Radzanowski & Smith, supra note 20, at 11 (describing European
complaints of China's underbidding for the launch contract of the Arabsat satel-
lite); discussion, infra Parts III, IV (analyzing the current arguments posed by
United States launch providers opposing launch agreements with non-market
economy launch providers).
42. See generally 1988 Space Roundtable, supra note 39 (suggesting that the
agreements with China set a good precedent for future negotiations, but until the
agreements are implemented, one cannot determine whether there exists a better
means for achieving United States goals).
43. See 1989 China Agreement, supra note 37, art. II(C)(i) (limiting China to
launching up to nine United States satellites); id. art. II(C)(ii) (stating that China
must distribute its commitments to launch United States satellites proportionately
over the nine-year term of the agreement).
44. After China's brutal June crackdown in Tiananmen Square only a few
months after signing the 1989 China Agreement, the United States passed legisla-
tion that severely restricted all satellite exports to China. See Foreign Relations
13:157
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Numerous satellite export sanctions were imposed on China from
1989 to 1993,4s thus prohibiting the launch of United States satellites
on Chinese rockets. These events suggest that the 1989 China
Agreement served as both a trade agreement and a political bargain-
ing chip.46 In 1992, Vice President Elect Albert Gore criticized the
previous administration's use of the 1989 China Agreement as a for-
eign policy tool.' In 1994, President Bill Clinton's Space Transpor-
tation Policy emphasized a more "pro-trade" approach in the space
launch services marketplace.4 ' The 1994 Space Policy set forth the
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 902, 104 Stat. 83, as amended by Pub.
L. No. 102-549, § 202(e), 106 Stat. 3658, repealed by 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
The legislation prohibited the export of United States-built satellites to China un-
less the President reported to Congress that China had achieved certain political
and human rights reforms or the export was in the national interests of the United
States. See id at § 902 (b) (1)-(2). The Tiananmen Square incident marked a sig-
nificant shift in Congressional support of United States trade normalization with
China. See Richard Bush, America's China Policy and the Role of the Congress,
the Press, and the Private Sector, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., July 9, 1991, available
in NEXIS, NEWS library (noting that after the Tiananmen Square incident, much
of the support in Congress for liberalizing trade with China collapsed). The export
bans for satellites were eventually waived by President Bush in December of 1989.
See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on the li-
censing of Communications Satellites for China, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1972 (Dec. 19, 1989). Violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), however, led to more export sanctions in April, 1991 and August, 1993.
See The Missile Technology Control Regime (visited Nov. 6, 1996)
<http:/www.acda.gov/factshee/exptconlmtcr96.htm> [hereinafter MTCR]; Dept.
of State Pub. Notice 1857, 56 Fed. Reg. 32601 (1991); Dept. of State Public No-
tice 1857, 58 Fed. Reg. 45408 (1993).
45. See discussion, supra note 44 (listing export sanctions against China).
46. See id (describing how the 1989 China Agreement was used as a means of
influencing relations with China in light of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown
and instances of illicit missile sales); Smith, supra note 14, at 5 (arguing that the
sale of United States F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan drove President Bush to waive
export restrictions on China in 1992 in an effort to improve relations between the
two nations).
47. See Gore Focuses on Bush-Quayle Failures in Aerospace, U.S. NEWSXWRE,
Oct. 19, 1992, available in NEXIS, NEWS library (stating that the previous ad-
ministration failed to establish space policies that focused on economic growth in
the Aerospace market).
48. See White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Fact Sheet:
National Space Transportation Policy (visited Feb. 13, 1997) (released August 5,
1994) <http://www.dot.gov/faa/cstreports/nstp2.html> [hereinafter 1994 Space
Policy] (suggesting that the goals in launch vehicle trade agreements are to foster a
market-based competitiveness in launch services).
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primary goal of achieving "free and fair trade"" in commercial
launch services.
At the conclusion of the first Chinese Space Launch Agreement in
December of 1994, China's entry into the space launch business was
less significant than expected. ° Chinese launches of Western pay-
loads suffered a series of failures5' while stringent export restrictions
limited the number of launches of United States satellites. 2 By 1994,
China was expected to launch only four out of the nine satellites
permitted under the 1989 China Agreement. 3 Western launch pro-
viders were less fearful of China's potential to take away market
share through abusive marketing practices. 4
The United States entered into a second launch trade agreement
with China in March 1995. 55 The agreement is expected to last until
December of 2001.56 Nevertheless, China continues to have difficulty
gaining market share. Repeated launch failures, 57 and resulting losses
of life,58 continue to erode confidence in China's launch vehicle pro-
gram.59 The nation's poor launch record also raised launch insurance
premiums to unmanageable levels."0 As a result, China acknowl-
49. Id. at 4.
50. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of Don-
ald Phillips, Ass't United States Trade Rep. for Industry) (noting China's slower
than expected entry into the launch services market).
51. See China's Satellite Launch Record 1990-95, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995
[hereinafter China Record].
52. See discussion, supra note 44 (listing export sanctions against China).
53. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 125 (testimony of Don-
ald Phillips, Ass't United States Trade Rep. for Industry).
54. See Tim Fumiss, Ariane's Bullish Chief, FLIGHT INT'L, July 13, 1994, at 23
(quoting Arianespace Chairman Bigot as saying that China is "not credible" in the
launch services market).
55. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. I.
56. See id art. VIII.
57. See China Great Wall Keeps Losing Launchers after Fatal Feb. 14 Failure,
SATELLITE NEws, April 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7056757 [hereinafter
GWIC Failures]; see also China Record, supra note 51 (showing that of the past
eight Chinese launches, four have been failures).
58. See GWIC Failures, supra note 57 (describing launch failures which
caused significant damage to nearby villages and killed 112 people).
59. See id, (stating that losses of life, increased insurance premiums and a 50%
success rate are causing customers to turn away from Chinese launch services).
60. See Long March Failures Bedevil China's Commercial Push, AVIATION
168 [13:157
COMMERCIAL SPACE LA UNCHSERVICFS
edged that it cannot compete in the launch services market without
61international cooperation.
C. FAILURES AT REACHING A MULTILATERAL TRADE FORUM: THE
UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN "RULES OF THE ROAD"
NEGOTIATIONS
To date, the industry's heavy reliance on government subsidies
have hindered efforts at reaching a multilateral trade agreement in
commercial launch services.62 A failed 1985 United States Section
301 petition, initiated pursuant to the United States Trade Act of
19746'3 against Arianespace, illustrates the difficulties of enforcing
fair trade laws in the face of pervasive government subsidies." The
United States could not claim that Arianespace was engaging in un-
fair trade vis-&-vis government subsidies because the United States
supported the shuttle program in much the same way."
WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 26, 1996 available in 1996 WL 10848638 (reporting
satellite insurance company executives' pessimistic reactions to an August 18,
1996, Long March mission failure and questioning China's future in commercial
launch services). One executive was quoted as saying that China's 50% success
rate makes their launch vehicles uninsurable. See id
61. See Craig Covault, China Seeks Cooperation, Airs New Space Strategy:
Beijing Calls for More Cooperation with the West as China Develops New Radar
and Telecom Satellites, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. Oct. 14, 1996 (describing
how China's push for economic cooperation is viewed as Chinese acknowledg-
ment that they are falling behind Western competitors).
62. See generally Garcia, supra note 23, at 364 (arguing that the General
Agreement on Trade and Services has been largely unsuccessful because, though it
addresses subsidies, it provides inadequate remedies); Restrictions Sought by
Lockheed Aren't Needed or Appropriate, Bigot Says, SATELLITE. WK., Oct. 3,
1994, available in 1994 WL 8734091 (responding to United States requests for
restricting United States satellite launches to United States launch vehicles, Ari-
anespace's Bigot counters that the United States should seek out government sub-
sidies just like everyone else).
63. See Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)). Even though authority for initiating an investigation by the
USTR is now found in § 2411 of the United States Code, it is still popularly re-
ferred to as Section 301 power. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
64. See Garcia, supra note 23, at 369 n.216 (describing the petition brought
against Arianespace and arguing that the failure of the 1985 Section 301 petition
highlights the inability of governments to enforce trade rules in the commercial
launch market).
65. See id at 17 (stating that the USTR did not take actions against Ari-
anespace because the government subsidies did not differ much from United States
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Pursuant to the 198466 and 198867 Congressional Acts, the United
States envisioned that the combination of bilateral trade agreements
and ongoing United States-European negotiations would lead to a
multilateral trading forum in commercial launch services.6 8 The first
determined effort to reach a multilateral trade agreement began in
1990 when President George Bush announced his National Space
Policy, 9 setting the stage for the "Rules of The Road" trade nego-
tiations.7"
Little is known about why the "Rules of The Road" talks failed to
achieve a mutual understanding of fair trading practices between the
United States and European representatives.71 The trade talks did,
however, reach an agreement to treat the non-market economies of
China and the former Soviet Union differently from their Western
counterparts.72 Nevertheless, subsequent efforts at establishing a
multilateral trading environment have yet to produce more compre-
hensive agreements.73
D. THE ENTRY OF FORMER SOVIET LAUNCH PROVIDERS INTO THE
COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES MARKET
The former Soviet Union encountered far greater United States
and European resistance to entering the commercial launch services
subsidies for the space shuttle).
66. See Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat.
3055 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70301 (1994)).
67. See Pub. L. No. 100-657, § 9, 102 Stat. 3900.
68. See 1988 Space Roundtable, supra note 39 (statement of E. McCallister,
Ass't Sec. of State for Econ. and Bus. Affairs) (stating that the 1989 China Trade
Agreement will set the stage for future agreements with other countries).
69. See New Space Launch Policy Generally Suits Industry, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Sept. 10, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2196002 [hereinafter Bush Space
Policy] (describing the Bush policy for fair trade negotiations with the European
Space Agency (ESA)).
70. See Trade Rep Urged to Consider Satellite With Launches in ESA Talks,
AEROSPACE DAILY, Oct. 19, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2195429 [hereinafter
ESA Talks].
71. See Garcia, supra note 23, at 366 (stating that the 1990-1992 United States-
European negotiations were conducted in relative secrecy).
72. See ESA Talks, supra note 70.
73. See U.S. Booster, Satellite Builders Accept Russian Launch Deal,
AEROSPACE DAILY, May 20, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2556992 (discussing
European inflexibility in negotiating trade rules for commercial launch services).
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market than China did in 1989. There are two reasons for this trepi-
dation. First, the former Soviet Union possessed advanced booster
technology74 and maintained a vast arsenal of vehicles far exceeding
commercial demand during the early 1990s." Second, fears of mis-
sile proliferation continued despite the demise of the Soviet Union.76
The Russians made their first significant in-road to the commercial
launch services market in June 1992 when Russia was allowed to
launch the United States-made INMARSAT" satellite on its Proton
launch vehicle," beginning the process of a future trade agreement.79
After a series of disputes over Russia's missile sales to India and
Russia's agreeing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR),8 ' the United States and Russia signed the 1993 Russia
Trade Agreement,' containing many of the same provisions as the
74. See Future of CIS Space Program Hinges on International Cooperation,
RuSsiAN AEROSPACE & TECH., April 6, 1992, available in 1993 VL 10245448
(stating that the Russians are technologically advanced in the area of launch vehi-
cle services).
75. See Garcia supra note 23, at 343-44 (quoting an Aerospace executive's es-
timate that "Russian capacity represents ten times current world market needs").
76. See Third World Space Launch Seen as Proliferation Concern, BMD
MONITOR, March 12, 1993, available in 1993 WVL 2914177 (quoting a report
which states that Russian and Ukrainian wishes to become space launch vehicle
providers "could lead to new ballistic missile threats during the remainder of this
decade"). A fear of ballistic missile proliferation, as an inevitable byproduct of
commercializing soviet booster technology, continues to this day. See discussion,
infra Part IH.A.1 (summarizing the arguments lodged against efforts to establish a
global market for space launch vehicles).
77. See International Maritime Satellite Consortium (INMARSAT) is an inter-
national organization founded in 1982 which provides satellite communication
systems for ships. See GOLDMAN, supra note 13, at 13.
78. See Russians Get Commercial Launch Agreement, SPACE STATION NEWS,
June 25, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2308308.
79. See id. (stating that the INMARSAT-Proton agreement marks the begin-
ning of the establishment of a United States-Russian trade agreement).
80. See Russian Satellite Deal Threatened by US. Concerns over Engine Ex-
port, COMM. DAILY, June 28, 1993, available in 1993 WL 3622966.
81. See United States Non-Proliferation Policy: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d. Cong., at 51 (1994) (statement by Lynn E.
Davis, Undersecretary of State for Int'l Security Affairs) (stating that in September
1993 Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed an agreement
for Russia's future entry into the MTCR).
82. See supra note 7.
1997]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1989 China Agreement.83
An amendment to the 1993 Russia Agreement was signed in
1996 4 In 1994, the Ukraine announced its intention to compete in
the commercial launch services market." In 1996, the Ukraine and
the United States signed the 1996 Ukraine Agreement.
8 6
The commercial relations precipitating the Russia and Ukraine
Agreements differ in some respects from the commercial space rela-
tions between China and the United States. Chinese business activi-
ties in the space launch industry are limited to United States satellite
launch deals on Chinese boosters. In contrast, when the 1993 and
1996 trade agreements with Russia were announced, United States
launch vehicle companies were busy pursuing joint business ventures
with their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.87 United States coop-
eration with the Russian Federation in the space launch services
market put the launch agreements into a new light because now re-
strictions on foreign launchers would also restrict United States
83. See 1989 China Agreement, supra note 37; see also discussion, infra Part
III (detailing the provisions of the 1993 Russian Trade Agreement).
84. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7; see also discussion, infra Part
III (describing the terms and conditions of the 1996 Russia Amendment).
85. See SATELLITE WK, May 10, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2612997 (unti-
tled article).
86. See supra note 8.
87. The first United States-Russia joint venture in commercial launch services,
Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energia-Intemational, was announced in early 1993. See
Lockheed Signs Deal With Russian Firm to Market Proton Launcher, SATELLITE
WK., Jan. 4, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2613949; see also Chris Bulloch, Riding
The Bear: Western Satellites on CIS Launchers, INTERAVIA Bus. & TECH., Nov. 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10896840 (noting that the joint venture has since
been renamed to International Launch Services (ILS)). By the end of 1995, there
were two additional joint ventures; STARSEM, between Russian and European
aerospace companies, see Trends in Space Launch Services, supra note 89 (stating
that the STARSTEM joint-venture is made up of the European groups Arianespace
and Aerospatiale and the Russian entities called the Russian Space Center and the
Samara Space Center); and Sea Launch, between the United States and Ukraine.
See id.
In addition to ILS, STARSEM and Sea Launch, several other related joint ven-
tures have been formed. See id.; Pierre Sparaco, Space Launch Industry Faces
Dramatic Change, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16, 1996, available in
1996 WL 10850268 (listing several other joint ventures with Russian Federation
launch providers).
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launch companies' business opportunities.' Today, there are an ever-
growing number of joint ventures between United States, Russian,
Ukrainian, and European launch service providers. 9
II. THE NATURE OF THE MARKETPLACE
A. DEMANDS IN THE COMMERCIAL SATELLITE MARKET
Space Launch vehicle providers serve both government and pri-
vate satellite needs. Until recently, most United States satellite
launches were for the United States government." Now, the majority
of business for space launch services comes from commercial enti-
ties.91
Most commercial space launch service contracts serve the satellite
communications market.92 The bulk of the satellite communications
market consists of Low Earth Orbit (LEO)93 and Geosynchronous
88. See United States Space Launch Strategy: Hearing Before the Space and
Aeronautic Subcomm. of the House Science Comm., 104th Cong. 48 (1996) [here-
inafter 1996 SLA Hearing] (testimony of Donald W. Eiss, United States Trade
Rep. for Industry and Labor, and Catherine Novelli, Deputy Assistant United
States Trade Representative for Eastern/Central Europe and Eurasia) (stating that
the special joint venture provisions in the Ukrainian agreement are "necessary to
accommodate the possible future entry of new United States-Ukrainian space
launch business ventures which return a significant and tangible benefits to the
United States economy").
89. See Federal Aviation Administration Special Report, Trends in Space
Launch Services: Globalization and Commercial Development, <http'/www.dot.
gov/faa/cst/bulletin/quarterly/9604/special.html> (visited April 4, 1996) [herein-
after Trends in Space Launch Services] (listing a variety of international joint
ventures forming with Russian and Ukrainian launch providers).
90. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFF. OF TECH. AsSEssMENT, ACCESS TO
SPACE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 3-6
(1990) [hereinafter ACCESS TO SPACE] (illustrating how the United States defense
and civil programs dominated the 1990 launch services market).
91. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 28 (testimony of Mr. Robert
Davis, Deputy Undersecretary for Space, Dept. of Defense) (reporting that com-
mercial launches outnumbered government launches in 1995 and 1996).
92. See James R. Asker, Commercial Growth Key to Space Sector, AVATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2235581 (calculating
the percentage of market share taken up by communications satellite launches).
93. Low Earth Orbit or LEO is defined as a satellite orbit that is" 100 to 1,000
nautical miles... above the surface of the Earth." See 1993 Russia Trade Agree-
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Earth Orbit (GEO) 94 systems. "' The GEO and LEO satellite systems
represent two approaches for providing the same type of satellite
telecommunication service to end-users.9 6 The GEO and LEO satel-
lite industries are therefore in direct competition with each other.
9 7
Competition between GEO and LEO satellite providers directly
correlates to the availability of launch vehicles in two respects. First,
satellite launch contracts usually include all costs associated with
placing a satellite into orbit, thereby bundling the cost of both the
launch vehicle and the satellite.9" Second, satellite contracts some-
times specify use of a particular launch vehicle because either the
launch service provider, or those acting in the interest of the launch
service provider, maintain a share in the satellite communications
venture.99 This aspect of the marketplace is significant for the fol-
ment, supra note 7, art. I.
94. Geosynchronous Earth Orbit or GEO refers to "an orbiting altitude of ap-
proximately 22,000 miles above the earth." See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement,
supra note 7, art. I.
95. See Asker, supra note 92.
96. See J.P. Schultz, Comment: Little LEOs and Their Launchers, 3 CoMM. L.
CONSPECTUS 185, 186 (1995) (contrasting LEO and GEO approaches to providing
satellite communications). The GEO satellite systems offer a single, continuous
source for users. See id.. In contrast, The LEO system deploys multiple smaller
satellites accessed by different users depending on the satellite's latitude-longitude
location. See id.
97. See, e.g., 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of
R. Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC)) (complaining that the dif-
ferent pricing guidelines between LEO and GEO launch services are hurting
OSC's competitive position in the LEO market).
98. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 64 (testimony of Robert
E. Berry, Pres. Space Systems/Loral) (stating that satellite communications cus-
tomers are becoming increasingly interested in purchasing the complete system for
placing a communication satellite into orbit).
99. See, e.g., Special Report: Chinese Trying to Restore Faith in Long March,
SATELLITE NEWS, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WiL 7057099 [hereinafter
Special Report] (stating that China's involvement in the IRIDIUM satellite pro-
posal could be the reason why China holds onto launch contracts despite a poor
launch record); 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57-58 (testimony of
Steven D. Dorfinan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (stating that
countries chose particular launch vehicles for political reasons); Anatoly
Tkachenko, Russia's Space Industry Is a Profitable Business, MOsCOW NEWS
WKLY., May 26, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10245448 (describing Russia's in-
vestment in the INMARSAT satellite proposal and the investment in Russian
launch capabilities for launches by this satellite consortium).
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lowing reason: a launch services trade agreement can easily manipu-
late or distort competition between the LEO and GEO providers by
specifying unequal terms under which LEO and GEO providers may
contract with available launch service providers."'
B. INVESTMENT IN SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The commercial space launch market is now in transition from
discriminatory government support structures toward a "free and fair
trade" environment.1 ' The launch vehicle market depends on gov-
ernment support and protectionism for several reasons. First, the
market for commercial launch services is low volume.' Second,
launch facility costs are too expensive to be supported by private in-
vestment. 3 Third, investments in launch vehicle technologies ex-
ceed private financial resources."'° Thus, the concept of" free and fair
trade" should be thought of as achieving mutually agreed upon trad-
ing rules,105 not necessarily trade free from substantial government
support structures.
An end to government financial dependence would facilitate a
transition towards free and fair trade; however, such an end will not
100. See id at 121-22.
101. See 1994 Space Policy, supra note 48; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, su-
pra note 8; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9; 1993 Russia Trade Agreement,
supra note 7.
102. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 89 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (stating that business volume is too low to support itself without govern-
ment assistance).
103. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 26 (testimony of Mr. Robert
Davis, Deputy Undersecretary for Space for the Dept. of Defense) (describing the
ways in which the United States supports launch facility costs for commercial
launches).
104. See The X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle, A New Way of Doing Business?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on
Science, 104th Cong. 59 (1995) [hereinafter X33 Testimony] (statement of Ray A.
Williamson, Senior Research Scientist, Space Policy Institute) (stating that the vi-
ability of the next generation launch vehicle depends on a substantial amount of
government investment).
105. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. III (D) (describing
"free and fair trade" as the absence of distorting grants or subsidies, inducements
to international customers, offering of additional services, or providing unauthor-
ized government financing).
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likely occur anytime soon. 10 6 In addition to the commercial market's
need for financial support, the United States and other participating
governments have substantial national security and foreign policy
interests in access to space. 07 As long as governments show a will-
ingness to spend vast amounts of resources in space launch capabil-
ity, no private entity can realistically enter the market solely through
private resources.'O'
C. THE RULES OF THE GAME
A competitor's reliance on government subsidies and strategies for
dealing with the technological limitations of today's launch vehicles
are the market forces guiding commercial launch service providers.
Government involvement in the space launch services industry has
the effect of hiding investment and support costs.'0 9 As a result, both
investment and launch costs are not reflected in the offering price to
a customer."0 A competitive launch provider therefore, depends on
the government to reduce costs.
The technological limits of today's launch vehicles create a unique
business environment. All service providers are, of course, concerned
with product reliability and cost; however, reliability in the launch
106. See generally X33 Testimony, supra note 104 (describing the need for gov-
ernment support well into the next decade) (statement of Ray A. Williamson,
Senior Research Scientist, Space Policy Institute).
107. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (listing the economic, politi-
cal and national security interests in supporting a space launch services industry ).
108. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 88 (testimony of Peter
B. Teets, Pres. Space Group, Martin Marietta Corp.) (stating that no private com-
pany can compete with a government).
109. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (recognizing that all nations with space launch vehicles rely on the gov-
ernment to shoulder some, if not most, of the costs). Consequently, the launch
services offering price does not accurately reflect the level of investment needed to
launch satellites into space.
110. See id.; Garcia, supra note 20, at 350-58; see also 1996 SLA Hearing, su-
pra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Opera-
tions McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (stating that the non-market nations are not con-
strained by real costs and have the unlimited potential to offer lower prices to get
market share).
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services industry is of paramount concern."' Contract prices influ-
ence customer choice of launch vehicles; but success in this market is
measured more in terms of a launcher's availability, mechanical reli-
ability, and scheduling."' Without a highly reliable product, launch
service providers compete by reducing the risk associated with space
launch. The attractiveness of a launch service provider therefore, is
measured in terms of the likelihood that the satellite will achieve or-
bit on time, not necessarily the lowest contract price."'
Launch vehicle unreliability forces competitors to minimize cus-
tomer risks through options for launches on several different launch
111. See, e.g., Special Report - Launch Capacity, Reliability Remain Key Issues,
SATELLITE NEWS, May 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7056815 [hereinafter
Launch Capacity Report] (stating that insurance providers are concerned over the
launch industry's one-out-of-seven aggregate launch failure rates); Chris McCon-
nell, Fingers Crossed Over Arianespace Launch: Series of Rocket and Satellite
Failures Has Industry on Edge, BROADCASTING & CABLE, March 13, 1995, avail-
able in 1995 WL 7938409 (reporting conditions in the satellite insurance industry
in 1995-following a year where insurance claims exceeded earned premiums-
stating that if the upcoming Arianespace launch is a failure, insurance premiums
could rise to a level that would threaten the viability of commercial space launch);
China's Exploding Space Program, WVORLD PRESS REV., June 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 8399697 (stating that China's poor launch record could erase its cost
advantage over other boosters and may even make Chinese-launched satellites
uninsurable); China Pressured to Prove Rocket Reliability, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS SERV., Feb. 15, 1995 (stating that China's launch vehicle has to become
more reliable); New Heights for Satellite Risks; Rising Demand Will Test Capacity,
BUS. INS., March 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7532127 (stating that China's
insurance premium has reached 27%). China's unwillingness to accept blame for
launch failures best demonstrates the importance of proving reliability in the
launch services market. See Hughes Sabotage of Rocket "Beyond Realms of
Credibility", AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Feb. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7760098.
112. See id; James M. Gifford, Going Up, SATELLITE Co.M ., Feb. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 9314323 (stating how satellite competitors have resorted to
bulk-launch vehicle purchases to cover delays, limited availability, and spread
risks in the event of launch failures); Special Satellite - '96 Wrap-Up Issue,
SATELLrrE NEWS, Feb. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7056695 [hereinafter Spe-
cial Satellite '96] (quoting INTELSAT's Claude Burgio as saying "capacity is the
name of the game in our business. Get it, launch it, and make it available as
quickly as possible").
113. See SS/Loral Inks Multimillion Dollar Launch Deal with Arianespace,
SATELLITE NEWs, May 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7056813 (quoting Ari-
anespace's Avanzi as saying "customers are less concerned with the price than
with the assurance that their payload will safely enter orbit").
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vehicles." 4 When a launch failure occurs, the stand-down time can
sometimes take several months."' Satellite customers who cannot
achieve orbit on time suffer significant lost opportumity costs." 6 As a
result, alternative launch options are bought-up, years in advance, to
cover costly delays and minimize risks." 7 To alleviate this problem,
major launch providers offer alternative launch vehicle manifests and
increase the number of available replacement launch vehicles." 8
Launch vehicle unreliability creates another highly influential
factor affecting the marketplace, satellite launch vehicle insurance
premiums."' Running as high as 27% of the total coverage for satel-
lites using a more risky launch vehicle, 20 insurance premiums can
effectively eliminate any cost advantage of one launch vehicle over
another.12' Moreover, costs for insuring satellite launches can run so
114. See Gifford, supra note 112.
115. See Official: Impact of Delta Explosion Could be Felt Into Next Year,
DEFENSE DAILY, Jan. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8105329 (quoting Frank
Weaver, Associate Admin. for the Dept. of Tran. Commercial Space Office as
saying that Delta-II launch failure will cause a four month setback in the Delta
launch manifest).
116. See Special Satellite '96, supra note 112.
117. See Gifford, supra note 112.
118. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 87 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (stating that Lockheed-Martin, a major launch service provider, offers Rus-
sian and United States launch vehicles with equal lift capacity and payload re-
quirements to meet customer needs for quicker turnaround times and minimal de-
lays).
119. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of poor
launch vehicle reliability on insurance rates); Launch Capacity Report, supra note
111 (reporting that despite the favorable investor views of the satellite industry,
insurance costs associated with launch vehicle unreliability must be addressed).
Simon Clapman, underwriter for Lloyd's of London, claims that the one-in-seven
aggregate failure rate of launch vehicles is unacceptable to the insurance industry;
indeed, insurance costs could threaten the satellite industry's future prosperity. See
id.
120. See Gavin Souter, New Heights for Satellite Risks: Rising Demand Will
Test Capacity, Bus. INS., March 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7532127 (stating
that a 27% insurance rate was charged for an Asiasat satellite launched on the
Long March rocket). Average insurance rates run from 14% to 20%. See id.
121. See Joseph Kahn, Asiasat Chooses Russian Rocket Over Long March for
Next Launch, ASIA-PACiFIC NEWS, March 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJA
3330404 (stating that the increased insurance rates for China's Long March vehi-
cle eliminated China's more attractive contract bid and made Russia's Proton
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high as to exceed insurance underwriter capacity."
Reliability, insurance, launch capacity, and scheduling difficulties
in the launch services market place new launch competitors, regard-
less of national origin, at a big disadvantage because their transpor-
tation systems are untested.'3 Even with low rates, these newcomers
will face difficulties in gaining market share." 4 China's failure to
capture a larger portion of the launch vehicle market provides the
best example 2
D. MARKET GROxvTH AND FUTURE DEMAND
Current market forecasts predict that launch provider revenue over
the next ten years will nearly double compared to the previous dec-
ade. 126 Satellite launch demand will surge as a result of significant
growth in demand for commercial GEO and LEO communication
satellites. 127 Estimated launch vehicle requirements for a broadband
LEO satellite constellation22 drives current "high growth models" 119
rocket the lowest bidder for the Asiasat satellite launch).
122. See Souter supra note 120 (stating that heavy launch vehicles such as the
Ariane V rocket, with a potential to carry up to S600 million in satellite hardware,
could test the resources of insurance underwriters).
123. See Satellite Owners Get Big Price Break from New Launch Suppliers,
SPACE Bus. NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8214950 [hereinafter New
Launch Suppliers] (stating that new suppliers from Japan, United States, and
Ukraine need to prove boosters before they can gain market share).
124. See id The minimum number of launches needed to establish a proven
success rate is twenty. More importantly, there has never been a launch vehicle
program that has not suffered a string of failures during its early years. Both the
United States and European launch vehicles suffered multiple launch failures in
the 1960s and 1980s, respectively. There is no reason to expect that newcomers
will not face these same sorts of difficulties.
125. See discussion, supra Part I.B and accompanying notes 54-57 (discussing
China's difficulties in gaining market, due to a series of launch failures and re-
sulting exodus of insurers for the Long March); supra note 111 (discussing the ef-
fects of multiple failures on China's commercial launch service).
126. See Sparaco, supra note 89, at 1 (predicting that 1997-2006 revenues will
be over $34 billion, compared to $18.3 billion for 1987-1996).
127. See id; see also Tim Furniss, Towards the Peak FLIGHT INT'L, July 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9460039 (stating that 65% of expected satellite
launches from 1996-2004 will be commercial, half of them to LEO).
128. See Asker, supra note 92 (describing the high-data communication rates in
the broadband Teledesic LEO system, a system requiring the launch from 840 to
over 1,000 communication satellites). But see Boeing Picked for 'Internet In the
1997]
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in the LEO marketplace.1 31
Market predictions of launch vehicle capacity have changed dra-
matically over the years. Early estimates predicted a sizable over-
capacity in the market.' Today, the predicted near-term under-
capacity will be followed by a severe glut.' Launch providers will
argue that no near-term shortage of launch vehicles exists; 133 how-
ever, the current backlog of available launch vehicles33 and increas-
Sky,' WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1997, at Al (stating that Boeing negotiated a scaled-
down version of Teledesic which would use only 288 satellites). The revised Tele-
desic requirements appear to show less demand for launch vehicles than what was
previously expected; however, satellites in the revised network are launch vehicle
payloads that are heavier and four-times more expensive and it appears that the
288 satellite constellation will be expanded once the system is operational. See id.
129. LEO Commercial Market Projections (visited Sept. 15, 1997)
<http://ast.dot.gov/reports/leo-c.pdf> at 9 [hereinafter 1997 LEO Market Fore-
cast]. The Federal Aviation Administration bases predictions on three growth
models, a "high growth", "modest growth" and "boundary condition" model. Id.
The "boundary condition" model estimates the outer reaches of launch vehicle
demand in the next nine years. Id. at 10.
130. The satellite systems driving launcher demand to GEO are not available.
See Report of the COMSTAC Technology & Innovation Working Group, Com-
mercial Spacecraft Mission Model Update (visited Sept. 15, 1997)
<http://ast.dot.gov/reports> at 9 (providing a list of companies providing input to
the market forecasts; however, COMSTAC maintains inputs as to each market
forecast in strict confidence so as to not divulge investment strategies to competi-
tors). The COMSTAC mission model provides market forecasts for launches to
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO), see id., the most common orbital destina-
tion for a GEO launch vehicle's upper stage. A satellite transfers from GTO to
GEO using an onboard propulsion system, or payload "kick motor".
131. See ACCESS TO SPACE, supra note 90, at 81 (stating that "[p]rojected
launch services supply far exceeds expected [1990] demand").
132. See 1997 LEO Market Forecast, supra note 129, at Fig. 4 (illustrating the
differences between the predicted launches from year-to-year. For example, com-
pare the predicted 103 satellites launched in 1997, with a forecasted 31 launches in
1999). There is a high degree of uncertainty in predicting the peaks and valleys in
launch vehicle demand. Compare id. (listing peaks and valleys in demand) with
Sparaco, supra note 89, at 2 (stating that Euroconsult predicts a sharp rise in 1997-
1998 followed by a glut in 2004-2005). See also COMSTAC Mission Model of
1997, supra note 130 (stating that planners cannot predict demands beyond five
years. Furthermore, the report warns that predicted peaks and valleys could vary
significantly from year-to-year).
133. See Gifford, supra note 112, at 1 (quoting ILS's President in response to
claims of under-capacity in launch vehicles that "[t]o say that people can't get
launches in the near term is not exactly true").
134. See Established Launches Record a Banner Year in 1996, SPACE Bus.
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ing launch manifests' suggest that a significant undercapacity now
exists and the potential effects on the commercial satellite business
could be significant.'36
The anticipated surge in satellite launcher demand has put in-
creasing pressure on the United States "transitional" strategy in the
launch services market.'37 The current debate centers on whether the
launch agreements can accommodate changing market conditions or
whether these trade instruments only serve to limit potential United
States revenues in the satellite market.13 8
III. THE SPACE LAUNCH AGREEMENTS
A. INCENTIVES BEHIND THE RUSSIAN, UKRAINE AND CHINESE
SPACE LAUNCH AGREEMENTS
The space launch agreements serve the purpose of encouraging
market reforms in non-market economies,' 39 increasing business op-
portunities for United States Aerospace industries,'40 and protecting
the United States launch industry from disruptive market practices.' 4'
NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8214951 [hereinafter 1996 Banner
Year] (stating that Arianespace's Ariane 4 currently has a backlog of 41 satellites
while McDonnell-Douglas's Delta H launch vehicle has a backlog of 38 satellites).
135. See id at 1 (stating that in the United States alone, 18 launches were con-
ducted in 1995, 25 launches in 1996, and 27 launches are predicted for 1997).
136. See Launch Capacity Report, supra note 111 (stating that launch vehicle
capacity is critical to the continued success of the commercial satellite industry).
137. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88 (opening statement of Rep. Dave
Weldon, Chairman of House Space and Aeronautics Subcomm.). Rep. Dave
Weldon, Chairman of Space and Aeronautic Subcommittee, takes the view that our
national priorities are often divergent from [the space commercialization goals of
the next century] and even work against efforts of our commercial sector. We have
policies that... promote unenforceable trade agreements with non-market econo-
mies and throw bureaucratic roadblocks in the way of commercial enterprises....
The international space launch trade agreements with China, Russia and Ukraine
are a perfect example of this confused and divergent thinking. See id
138. See discussion, supra Part III.D (discussing in detail the arguments lodged
against the current launch agreements).
139. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 50 (testimony of Catherine
Novelli, Deputy Ass't United States Trade Representative for Eastern / Central
Europe and Eurasia).
140. See id
141. See id
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The agreements also serve a related foreign policy interest in reduc-
ing incentives for countries to engage in illicit dual-use technology
exports. 42 The current debate focuses primarily on achieving United
State's economic goals in the commercial space marketplace.'43
1. Missile Proliferation Concerns
United States fears of missile proliferation through trade in space
launch vehicle services1" has not driven the debate since sanctions
were lifted against GWIC in 1994.141 This is not to say that trade in
launch services does not continue to raise concerns of national secu-
rity, 14 any trade in dual-use technologies is of constant concern.
Space launch vehicles, in particular, pose a substantial risk of illicit
use as there is little difference between a satellite launch vehicle and
a transportation system for weapons of mass destruction. 47 It is sug-
gested that nations will not necessarily invest in space launch serv-
ices for the purpose of expanding domestic markets. 48 Rather, na-
tions invest in the launch of satellites for the purpose of supporting
142. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that as a
prerequisite to entering into the treaty, the government of the Ukraine is required
to fulfill its obligations in adhering to United States polices regarding the
"[t]ransfer of missile equipment and technology"); discussion, supra Part I.B and
accompanying notes (discussing United States requirements that China adhere to
the MTCR as a prerequisite to entering into the commercial space launch market);
discussion, supra Part I.D and accompanying notes (stating that the 1993 Russia
Agreement was signed after Russia became a member of the MTCR). But see 139
CONG. REC. S10935, at S10935 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) [hereinafter CONG.
DEBATE] (statement of Sen. McCain) (asserting that the United States is supporting
a military establishment by entering into launch agreements with countries like
China).
143. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 7 (opening statement of Rep.
Ralph M. Hall).
144. See CONG. DEBATE, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
145. See discussion, supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (stating that after
the Clinton Administration announced its 1994 Space Policy, no further sanctions
were applied to China or the Russian Federation).
146. See CONG. DEBATE, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. See id. (stating that missile technology is indistinguishable from space
launch vehicle technology).
148. See CONG. DEBATE, supra note 142 (arguing that there exists a strong po-
tential for proliferation of missile technology by nations who invest in space tech-
nology but whose investments are not economically viable in the commercial sec-
tor).
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the development of ballistic missile programs.'4 9
B. SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGY
The basic protective scheme for Western commercial launch vehi-
cles relies on pricing guidelines and quantitative limits.E° The
agreements address satellite launch needs by providing provisions for
increasing the launch quotas in the event of increased demand, and
implementing flexible pricing guidelines.' While the terms of the
agreement have changed somewhat since the 1989 China Agree-
ment,' the same basic approach has been followed in subsequent
agreements.1
53
C. REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND THE TERMS OF THE LAUNCH
AGREEMENTS
The launch agreements exclude launches for military or other gov-
ernmental purposes and place restrictions on launches for interna-
tional customers.1" A notice of guidelines has been issued for the
149. Military Space Power, supra note 29, at 182 (statement of Dr. Scott Pace,
Policy Analyst, Critical Technologies Institute, The Rand Corp.) (stating that na-
tions "seeking their owyn ballistic missiles have been tempted to offset develop-
ment costs by offering 'commercial' launch services.").
150. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, arts. IV, V; 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, arts. IV, V; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note
8, arts. IV, V; 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, arts. IV, V.
151. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, arts. IV, V; 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, arts. IV, V; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note
8, arts. IV, V; 1996 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, arts. IV, V.
152. Compare 1989 China Agreement, supra note 37, art. V (stating that prices
need to be roughly equivalent and setting a nine launch quota for a six year period)
with 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, arts. IV, V (setting a minimum price
limit, Article IV, and increasing quotas from nine to fifteen, Article V, including
an Annex of non-price factors, but otherwise maintaining the same pricing struc-
ture). The Russian and Ukraine agreements contain the same format as the 1995
China agreement. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. V; 1996
Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. V; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra
note 8 art. V.
153. See supra note 152 (discussing the similar strategies employed in the 1993,
1995 and 1996 agreements).
154. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, arts. IV, V; 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, arts. IV, V; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note
8, arts. IV, V; 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, arts. IV, V (updating LEO
1997]
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1989 China Agreement,155 1993 Russia Agreement,156 and the 1995
China Agreement.'57 The guidelines set forth responsibilities of dele-
gated interagency review committees and working groups as well as
the means chosen for implementing and monitoring each of the sepa-
rate agreements. 1
58
1. Duties and Functions of the Lead Subcommittee
The Trade Policy Staff Subcommittee on Space Launch Services
(Subcommittee)" 9 conducts ongoing assessments of the operation of
launching provisions).
155. See International Trade in Commercial Launch Services; Guidelines for
Implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement With the People's Republic of
China, 54 Fed. Reg. 4,931 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 China Agreement Guidelines].
156. See Guidelines for United States Implementation of The Agreement Be-
tween the United States and Russian Federation Regarding International Trade in
Commercial Space Launch Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,360 (1994) [hereinafter 1993
Russia Trade Agreement Guidelines].
157. See International Trade in Commercial Space Launch Services: Guidelines
for Implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement With the People's Republic
of China, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,796 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 China Agreement Guide-
lines]. The 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, the most recent statement on the
United State's implementation of the Space Launch Agreements, will be the pri-
mary source for the discussion of administrative functions relating to the agree-
ments. The 1993 Russian Agreement Guidelines will be referenced when terms
and provisions peculiar to the United States-Russia agreements are discussed. The
guidelines are approved by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (Trade Committee)
and The Office of The United States Trade Representative (USTR). See id. at
20,796. The authority for monitoring the agreements is vested in the Subcommit-
tee for Space Launch Services, chaired by the USTR. See id. The Subcommittee
Working Group on Information, chaired by the Department of Transportation, is
responsible for data collection. See 1989 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note
155, at 4,932; 1993 Russia Trade Agreement Guidelines, supra note 156, at
11,361-62; 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,796.
158. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,797; 1993
Russia Trade Agreement Guidelines, supra note 156, at 11,361-62. Since the
guidelines for the implementation of the 1996 Russia Amendments and the 1996
Ukraine Agreement have not yet been issued, the administrative functions and
methodologies discussion herein are primarily based on the guidelines issued pur-
suant to the 1993 Russia Agreement and 1995 China Agreement. The author as-
sumes that the guidelines associated with the 1996 agreements will not differ sig-
nificantly from the 1993 and 1995 guidelines.
159. See supra note 157 (discussing the responsibilities and inter-agency repre-
sentatives comprising the Subcommittee).
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each agreement relative to United States goals 60 and ensures compli-
ance by providers based in non-market economies.' 6' The Subcom-
mittee performs these functions by gathering data on industry devel-
opments,16 exchanging pricing data on satellite launches'63 and
160. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,796. The
United States goals and objectives under the agreement are four-fold:
Continuing the integration of [Chinese] launch services providers into the in-
ternational market on a non-disruptive basis; (ii) providing a stable interna-
tional environment within which United States space launch companies can
compete on a fair basis while [Chinese] launch service providers continue
their transition to fully absorb the disciplines of the marketplace (costs, prices,
profits); (iii) ensuring that administration of the Agreement responds to
changing conditions so as to support the continued success in the international
commercial marketplace of all segments of the United States space industry,
i.e., space launch companies, satellite manufacturers, and system operators;
and (iv) avoiding shortages of space launch capability that would prevent the
development of new uses of space.
Id
161. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,796. The
Subcommittee is to monitor Chinese compliance with the terms of the treaty by
"assessing information relevant under the treaty" for launches and market partici-
pation. See id
162. See id at 20,796-97 (describing how the working group gathers informa-
tion on a continual basis and presents forecasts on market developments). The
Federal Aviation Administration publishes and receives annual market forecasts as
part of its data collection duties. See LEO Commercial Market Projections,
<http://ast.dot.gov/reports> (visited Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 LEO Market
Forecast]; Report of the COMSTAC Technology' & Innovation Working Group :
Commercial Spacecraft Mission Model Update, <http.//ast.dot.gov/reports> (vis-
ited Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter COMSTAC Mission Model]. The 1995 China
Agreement guidelines describe far more extensive data collection duties and other
market-related duties of the working group, as well as greater recognition of mar-
ket needs, than the 1993 Russian Agreement Guidelines. Compare 1995 China
Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,796 (listing strong concerns against
artificially restraining market forces while describing continual efforts to update
market predictions and adjust quota provisions when the market changes) with
1993 Russia Trade Agreement Guidelines, supra note 156, at 11,361 (providing
only very cursory information on the duties and activities of the Subcommittee,
and offering little more than a restatement of the treaty).
163. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. II (describing data exchange
protocol with non-market national representatives and industry). The agreements
state that there "shall be" an open data exchange on pricing and costs for commer-
cial launch services offered. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art.
VIII; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. VIII; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 8, art. VIII. If the requested pricing data contains business pro-
prietary information, the information need only be in summary form. See 1995
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consulting with industry and non-market nations representatives.'
2. Cooperation Between the Subcommittee and Affected United
States Industries
Pursuant to United States' goals, 6 ' the Subcommittee must ac-
commodate the needs of both the satellite and launch vehicle indus-
tries. '66 One important way in which it does this is to monitor com-
pliance with the launch agreements. The Subcommittee works
towards accommodating the needs of the launch industry by scruti-
nizing the terms and conditions of a launch contract,'67 including
identifying prohibited inducements,'68 unauthorized government sup-
China Agreement, supra note 9, art. VIII; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra
note 8, art. VIII; 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. VIII.
164. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. VII; 1996 Ukraine Trade
Agreement, supra note 8, art. VII; 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. VII.
The agreements call for annual government consultations with a comprehensive
review every three years. See id. The Subcommittee solicits information from the
United States launch vehicle and satellite industries prior to consultations. See
1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,797. Consultation is also
needed if there has been a significant change in market demand or there are prob-
lems with a party's compliance with the terms of the agreement. See 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, art. VII; 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 8,
art. VII; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. VII.
165. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (outlining the United States
goals).
166. See generally 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at
20,796 (stating the goals of achieving fair trade in the launch vehicle industry
while recognizing the needs of the satellite market).
167. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. III; 1996 Ukraine
Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. III; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art.
III.
168. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. I (defining the term
"inducements" as "any incentive offered or provided to influence the purchase of
a commercial launch service including, but not limited to, the provision of any re-
source unrelated to the launch service competition"); 1996 Ukraine Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 8, art. II (defining "inducements" as "unreasonable political
pressure, the provision of any resources of commercial value unrelated to the
launch service competition and offers of favorable under or access to defense and
national securities policies and programs, development assistance policies and
programs, and general economic policies and programs"); 1995 China Agreement,
supra note 9, art. II (agreeing that neither China nor the United States will give
"inducements of any kind in connection with the provision of commercial launch
services").
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port or financing,"' and unfair business practices."'
The needs of satellite vendors or satellite operators are addressed
by preventing any unintended effects on supply and demand as a re-
sult of the trade agreements.17' These potential market influences
may lie in the trade agreement's distinctions drawn between GEO
and LEO launches,'7 the effect of quotas on multiple payload
launches or future proposals for satellite launch systems," and
shortages of Western launch vehicles.
74
169 See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. HI (stating that non-
market countries are required to refrain from government financing of launch ve-
hicles or services except in accord with the terms of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Arrangement on Guidelines for
Officially-Supported Export Credits).
170. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. I (stating that the term
"'unfair business practices' includes the making of any offer" to a government
official for "purposes of obtaining or retaining business"); 1996 Ukraine Trade
Agreement, supra note 8, art. II (defining 'unfair business practices' as "the mak-
ing of any offer" to a government official "for the purpose of obtaining or retain-
ing business"); 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. II (stating that any direct
or indirect government support will be "in accord with practices prevailing in the
international market").
171. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,796 (stating
that the market, rather than the agreements themselves, should dictate the course of
commercial space ventures).
172. See generally id at 20,796-97 (stating that the Subcommittee will monitor
the agreement "carefully so as to ensure that the Agreement does not create an ar-
tificial advantage for business proposals simply by virtue of the orbit of the satel-
lites that provide the service").
173. See generally id at 20,797 (recognizing that potential business proposals
will be evaluated and may lead to a modification of the launch quotas).
174. See it at 20,798-99. In determining that there is a lack of available West-
em launch vehicles, the 1995 China Agreement Guidelines require the satellite
customer to meet the following four requirements:
(1) A statement certifying that the... international customer ... has con-
tacted all launch service providers with a technically compatible vehicle, in-
cluding all such domestic launch service providers;
(2) A statement certifying that the... international customer... [has con-
tacted the Chinese government and there is a launch slot available];
(3) A statement that the [Chinese] launch service provider is the only launch
service provider that is available... ;
(4) A statement that the certifying official is a certifying official of the certi-
fying entity and is familiar with and responsible for the negotiations regarding
the proposed launch based on information and belief.
Id
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3. Monitoring and Enforcement of The Agreements
The Russia, China, and Ukraine launch agreements require flexi-
ble pricing and quota guidelines.' Launch quotas depend on market
developments.'76 The pricing guidelines serve as a method for re-
vealing questionable market bids. If the contract bid falls more than
fifteen percent below a comparable Western launch bid, the Sub-
committee will first consider whether non-price factors justify the
price difference."' Non-price factors include risk management,'
175. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 48 (testimony of Don-
ald W. Eiss, United States Trade Representative for Industry and Labor) (arguing
that the pricing and quota guidelines need to be flexible because the market is dif-
ficult to predict).
176. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. IV; 1996 Ukraine Trade
Agreement, supra note 8, art. V; see also 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7,
art. V (stating that if there are favorable changes in launch vehicle demand, either
by current market conditions or through the parties mutual belief that launch vehi-
cle demand increase is imminent, the parties can increase launch quotas, following
special consultations). The agreements also recognize potential future satellite pro-
posals which could radically change market demands and lead to favorable recon-
sideration, if not elimination of launch restrictions. See id.
177. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,799 (stating
that when a bid falls below the pricing threshold of 15%, the Subcommittee will
look at the non-price factors set forth in the Annex of the agreements). Each of the
currently active agreements contains a list of factors that enter into a contract price
for launch services. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. II; 1996 Ukraine
Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. VIII (3); 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note
7, art. VIII (3). The non-price factors are intended to offset the significant differ-
ences between Western and non-market economy launch provider services and the
varied nature of satellite mission requirements. See 1995 China Agreement, supra
note 9, art. VIII (Annex). The 1995 China Agreement identifies six non-price fac-
tors: (1) Intended Orbit, see id. (distinguishing launch contracts that provide orbit
insertion at the desired perigee from satellites which use their own perigee kick-
motors); (2) Risk Management, see id. (addressing the sometimes substantial dif-
ferences between Western and non-market nations launch insurance premiums);
(3) Integration Costs-Launch Support, see id. (referring to complexities unique to
Chinese launches, for example, cumbersome technology transfer restrictions,
transportation costs, and cost of integrating different technologies); see also 1989
China Tech Tran Agreement, supra note 35 (outlining security requirements for
launching in China); Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology Safe-
guards between the Governments of The United States of America and The Peo-
ple's Republic of China, February 11, 1993, U.S.-PRC, State Dept. 93-56 (en-
forced Feb. 11, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 China Tech Tran Agreement] (updating
the 1989 technology transfer agreement); (4) Required Vehicle Payload Lift Capa-
bility (ensuring that any price comparison will be between vehicles which have the
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launch vehicle insurance,179 differences in launch technology and
mission requirements. 8 ' If the non-price factors do not justify the
contract underbid, the Subcommittee will engage in special consulta-
tion with the non-market national representative. 8' If there is no sat-
isfactory resolution, the Subcommittee can ask the USTR to initiate a
formal Section 301 investigation.1
82
The launch agreements do not alter the USTR's Section 301 in-
vestigatory powers'1 3 under the United States Trade Act of 1974. 1'
same lift and orbit insertion requirements), see 1995 China Agreement, supra note
9, art. VIII (Annex); (5) Payment Conditions and Terms, see id (referring to dif-
ferent forms of compensation which may not be reflected in the contract price);
and (6) Lifetime, see id (referring to satellite structural fatigue or outright failures
which may occur as a result of, or during ascent into orbit).
178. See supra note 177; see also discussion, supra Part II.C and accompanying
notes (describing the risks associated with launch vehicle reliability); discussion,
supra Parts I.B, I.D (describing the political climate surrounding satellite export
licenses to non-market nations).
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (including insurance costs
within the launch vehicle cost); discussion, supra Part II.C (describing the extreme
importance of establishing good launch records to minimize the launch insurance
premiums that can be as much as 27% of the coverage price).
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting that the differences in
technology between non-market and Western economies are not reflected in con-
tract prices).
181. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. IV; 1996 Russia Amend-
ment, supra note 7, art. VII; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art.
Vill.
182. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994) (describing general authority of the USTR).
See generally supra note 63 and accompanying text (giving reason for § 2411 ref-
erence to Section 301 sanctions). The USTR, in order to force an offending party
to comply with fair trading practices, can:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agree-
ment concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country re-
ferred to in such subsection;
(B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of,
such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines
appropriate.
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c) (1) (1994).
183. The agreements expressly provide that the United States retains all powers
granted by domestic and international laws. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement,
supra note 7, art. VI; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. V; 1996 Ukraine
Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. VII; see also 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note
88, at 49 (statement of Donald W. Eiss, United States Trade Representative for In-
dustry and Labor) (arguing that the United States can take unilateral action unre-
1997]
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This legal authority might seem like an important part of the en-
forcement process, nevertheless, no Section 301 investigation has yet
taken place.185 Some members of the launch vehicle industry ask the
United States to take a more active role in enforcing fair trade
through Section 301 sanctions,8 6 while the satellite industry supports
trade sanctions only if there is clear evidence of a trade agreement
violation. 18 7 The difference of opinion lies in whether the USTR, or
industry should take responsibility for establishing proof of a trade
violation.'88
Current quotas set limits on the number and frequency of GEO
launches by Russia,'8 9 Ukraine, 90 and China. 91 The quotas can
stricted by the terms of the agreements); 1995 China Agreements Guidelines, su-
pra note 157, at 20,798 (stating that the Subcommittee will recommend whether
the USTR should undertake a formal Section 301 investigation).
184. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
185. See generally discussion, supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (dis-
cussing how the USTR refused to take actions against China at the request of Ari-
anespace for the Arabsat satellite launch bid); discussion, supra Part I.C and ac-
companying notes (stating that the USTR refused to take action against
Arianespace in 1985 because the United States uses subsidies for the commercial
shuttle program).
186. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of R.
Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp.) (asking that the United States begin
to seriously take a look at enforcing the launch agreement pricing provisions by
using Section 301 procedures).
187. See id. at 72 (statement of Bary Bertiger, Corporate Vice President and As-
sistant Gen. Manager, Satellite Communications Division of Motorola) (stating
that Section 301 sanctions are needed; however, the United States should initiate
proceedings only when the moving party provides clear evidence that there has in
fact been a violation). Mr. Bertiger argues that launch service complainants, not
satellite manufacturers, should bear the burden of showing a trade violation. See
id. By placing the burden on a moving party, satellite export licensing delays, as-
sociated with requiring the USTR to certify compliance, would be avoided. See id;
The Export Administration Act of 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong. 73 (1994) (statement of Henry D. Sokolski, Fellow, National
Institute for Public Policy) (describing the efforts of industry to avoid delays in
government issuance of export licenses when trade issues are investigated by enti-
ties including the State Department and the USTR).
188. See id.
189. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV (listing quota provi-
sions and outlining the "non-bunching" requirement over a seven-year period).
190. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (stating quota
provisions and outlining the "non-bunching" requirement over a seven-year pe-
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change, depending on market developments.'92 Quota provisions are
evaluated by use of market forecasts.'93
4. Restrictions on LEO Launches
The agreements also place quotas on individual LEO satellite
launches; however, neither quotas nor pricing guidelines for
launches of LEO satellite constellations are clearly defined due to
market uncertainties. 9 ' Instead, the agreements require that the sum
riod). The Ukraine agreement sets forth quota provisions that distinguish between
launches made by United States-Ukraine joint ventures verses launches by Ukraine
launch providers. See id.
191. See 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. 11(B) (stating quota provi-
sions and outlining the "non-bunching" requirement over a seven-year period).
192. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV. Launch quota allot-
ments may be increased pursuant to the agreements, if the overall market grows at
a certain specified rate, or if the United States and the respective nation mutually
agree that a general increase in launch capacity is likely. See id; 1996 Ukraine
Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. H (B); 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9,
art IV (4).
193. See 1995 China Agreement Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,797 (stating
that the United States will assess whether market conditions warrant increasing
quotas); see generally COMSTAC Mission Model, supra note 162 (giving an ex-
ample of market forecasts for launch vehicles serving the GEO satellite market).
194. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV (3) (stating that Russia
is limited to three LEO satellite launches which are not part of the initial deploy-
ment of the satellite constellation); 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 7,
art. V (2) (stating that the Ukraine is governed by the terms of the GEO launch
quota provisions for single LEO satellites not part of the LEO satellite constella-
tion initial deployment). But see 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, arts. H-V
(showing no similar provisions for Chinese launches of LEO satellites). The 1995
China Agreement does not contain any quotas for LEO satellite launches because
at that time, the market for LEO satellites was too uncertain. See 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, art. 11 (B) (iii) (b) (stating that the "United States recog-
nizes that the participation of [Chinese] launch services in [the LEO] market could
be substantial").
195. See generally 1997 LEO Market Forecast, supra note 162, at 3 (illustrating
how the LEO market is highly uncertain and could adversely affect the launch ve-
hicle requirements, depending on which proposals are actually implemented); su-
pra, Part II.D and accompanying notes (describing how the evolving market for
LEO constellations could radically change launch vehicle demand); 1996 Russia
Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV (3) (describing how market uncertainties can
have a dramatic effect on the pricing and quota provisions for LEO satellite
launches). The 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement and 1996 Russia Amendment
contemplate that in the course of ascertaining the market for LEO satellite launch
vehicles, the parties may determine that current events would "justify favorable
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total participation in the deployment of a LEO satellite system by
non-market nations not be greater than the participation by the
West. 9 6 In order to avoid unintended effects on the course of busi-
ness, assessments of compliance with the LEO deployment guide-
lines also consider scheduling, availability, and customer require-
ments.19
7
LEO launch restrictions impose the biggest challenge to the draft-
ers of the bilateral trade agreements.' 98 The "loose" LEO guidelines
reflect an inability of the parties to reach a mutual understanding on
the needs of the LEO market. 99 United States representatives hope
that by continually monitoring market developments, the guidelines
will be effective in maintaining a proportionate United States market
share in launch services without debilitating United States satellite
manufacturers and operators' competitive position in the market-
place.2"
reconsideration for elimination of the criteria." 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement,
supra note 8, art. V (3); see 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV (3).
"[A] commercially viable project for satellite services that fundamentally changes
demand for launch services," could qualify for such favorable reconsideration.
1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (3); 1996 Russia Amend-
ment, supra note 7, art. IV (3).
196. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. V (1); 1996 Ukraine Trade
Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (3). The pricing guidelines for LEO orbits simply
require non-market nation bids to be comparable to Western launch providers,
with launches of LEO satellite deployments considered on a "case-by-case" basis.
See id.
197. In assessing guideline compliance, the Subcommittee can take into account
the following factors: "launch scheduling requirements . .. the availability of
competitively priced market economy launches ... opportunities made available to
other parties for participation in the replacement market; reasonable considerations
by the proposed system operator regarding commercial risk sharing; and, custom-
ers' requirements." 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (3).
198. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 52 (statement of Don-
ald W. Eiss, United States Trade Representative for Industry and Labor, and Cath-
erine Novelli, Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern /
Central Europe and Eurasia) (noting that the administration has yet to specify
pricing and quota provisions for the LEO market due to a lack of knowledge and
experience in that market).
199. See id. and accompanying text.
200. See generally id. (noting that the administration is committed to developing
a workable set of guidelines as satellite ventures unfold in the LEO market); supra
note 160 and accompanying text (listing the goals of ensuring minimal market dis-
ruption, letting the market decide which commercial satellite ventures are viable
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5. Technology Transfer Safeguards
The United States tightly controls satellite exports because most
satellites or their components are classified as dual-use technolo-
gies.01 The launch agreements state that all exports of United States
satellites will be determined on a "case-by-case basis" 2  with no ef-
fect on the sovereign authority to issue export licenses. 2 3 The
authority to issue licenses is vested in the State Department.2" The
granting of an export license is contingent on the importing nation
establishing a technology control plan.05 These control plans differ
in scope, depending on whether the satellite is launched by a Chi-
nese, Russian, or Ukrainian launch service provider.06
and not creating artificial distinctions between satellite ventures solely based on
the intended orbit).
201. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 29 (testimony of Dr.
Martha Caldwell Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls, Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (arguing that satellites use technologies which can be
easily converted into applications which would threaten national security). Dr Har-
ris argues that the risks associated with exporting satellite technology requires the
State Department to maintain control over export licenses. See id
202. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. VI (2); 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, art. V (2); 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8,
art. VH (3).
203. See id. (stating that "nothing in this agreement shall be construed to mean
that the United States is constrained from taking appropriate action with respect to
any United States export license").
204. See supra note 202, and sources cited therein; see also 1995 China Agree-
ment Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,798 (stating that the Subcommittee shall
supply the Department of State information on the implementation of the agree-
ment as it would pertain to the Secretary of State's duties in licensing satellite ex-
ports).
205. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. VI (1); 1993 China
Tech Tran Agreement, supra note 177; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra
note 8, art. VII (1)-(2).
206. The United States imposes far more stringent technology transfer safe-
guards on China than Russia or the Ukraine. Compare 1993 Russia Trade Agree-
ment, supra not6 7, art. VI (1) and 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8,
art. VI (stating that prior to launches parties must put forward a technology control
plan) with 1993 China Tech Tran Agreement, supra note 177 (listing requirements
for any export of United States satellite technology to China, including stringent
restrictions on technical data, badge access controls, electronic monitoring, inde-
pendent facilities for United States personnel, transportation, and other require-
ments). The nature of relations with Russia verses China account for these differ-
ences in technology transfer safeguards. Compare discussion, supra Part I.D and
accompanying notes (describing how trade and joint business ventures are encour-
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6. Distinctions Between Russian Federation and Chinese Launch
Providers
China's launch industry remains relatively isolated" 7 and offers a
limited capability in launch vehicles." 8 In contrast, the Russian Fed-
eration's participation in the launch services market is highlighted by
international joint ventures,2"9 in particular Ukraine's joint venture
with Boeing Aerospace,2"0 and a wider variety of space launch serv-
ices.
The 1993 Russia Agreement addresses the greater capabilities of
Russian booster vehicles by placing special quota provisions for
dual-payload launches,2 1' and including Russian-built satellites that
are leased to international customers in the trade agreement's pricing
and quota provisions. 2 The Ukrainian Agreement draws distinctions
aged with Russia and other Russian Federation member states) and 1993 Russia
Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. I (stating that the agreement is reached in the
interests of joint exploration of space) and United States Nonproliferation Policy
1993: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 2 (1993)
(statement of Lynn E. Davis, Undersecretary of State for International Security Af-
fairs) (describing the advancements in Russia-United States relations regarding
ballistic missile threats); with discussion, supra Part I.B (listing the many export
sanctions imposed on China and the United States' reaction to the 1989 Tianan-
men Square incident), and the regulation of trade with China. See supra, note 44
and accompanying text (stating that satellites may be exported to China only if the
president finds that the exports are (1) in the national interests or (2) China has
achieved human rights reform).
207. See Covault, supra note 61, at 1 (remarking that China's interest in pursu-
ing international cooperation in Aerospace is a break from the past).
208. See Tim Furness, Mass Defections, FLIGHT INT'L, Apr. 3, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 9459951 (stating that even in the best of times China could only
launch five satellites per year, which is far below the capabilities of the established
launch providers).
209. See supra notes 87-89 (discussing the joint ventures formed between the
West and the Russian and Ukrainian launch service providers).
210. See supra notes 88-89 (describing the "Sea Launch" joint venture as well
as other Ukraine joint ventures with Western partners).
211. 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV; 1996 Russia Amend-
ment, supra note 7, art. IV; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV.
The distinctions between "principal" and "dual-payload" launches, reflect the
medium and heavy lift capabilities of Russian launch vehicles. See id,
212. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV; 1996 Russia
Amendment, supra note 7, art. IV; see also 1993 Russia Agreement Guidelines,
supra note 156, at 11,361 (stating that there is no difference between the launch of
a Western-built satellite for an international customer and a Russian built satellite
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between domestic launches213 and launches via an "integrated space
launch service provider."2"4 For domestic launches, the usual pricing
and quota provisions apply. 25 Launches undertaken by a joint ven-
ture, however, need to meet special qualifications 2"6 before the joint
venture may receive the more favorable quota allotment of an "inte-
grated launch service provider.'1237 These special requirements for
Russian and Ukrainian launchers suggest that the agreements serve
the purpose of limiting participation where market guidelines do not
provide adequate assurances against predatory pricing. Without an
ability to impose more explicit agreements on trading practices, the
United States resorts to trade agreements that place artificial barriers
in the marketplace.
which is leased to an international customer).
213. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (2) (defining a
"Ukrainian launch service provider" as any entity acting on behalf of the
Ukraine); id, art. V (1) (listing special quotas imposed on a Ukrainian launch
service provider).
214. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (2) (defining an
"integrated launch service provider" as any joint venture between a United States
and Ukrainian company in the field of rocket and space technology). In order to
qualify as an "integrated launch service provider", a venture must obtain "a com-
mercial launch license issued by the United States Department of Transportation,"
while a "U.S. partner maintains a significant equity interest in, and control in fact.
. and the U.S. is the source of a significant share of the goods and services... ;"
and the "majority of the goods and services utilized ... in any space launch have
their origin in market-economy countries." Id
215. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V. The 1996
Ukraine Trade Agreement applies the same market participation guidelines to a
"Ukrainian launch service provider" as a Russian launch service provider or a
Chinese launch service provider. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7,
art. V; 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7, art. V; 1995 China Agreement, su-
pra note 9, art. V.
216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (describing the prerequisites for
"integrated launch service provider" status).
217. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V." Ukrainian space
launch services" may provide from five to six GEO launches for international
customers. Id. art. V(1). In contrast, Ukrainian space launch vehicles supplied to
an "integrated space launch services provider" can range from ten to fourteen
space launch vehicles. See id
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D. DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING NEGOTIATED TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN THE LAUNCH VEHICLE MARKETPLACE
The usefulness of the launch trade agreements in effectively pro-
moting a market-orientated commercial launch services environment
is the focus of heated debates." ' Disagreement focuses upon the use
of launch quotas and pricing guidelines." 9 Industry criticisms of the
pricing guidelines and launch quotas are not new.220 However, de-
mands from a growing space market since 1994 have spurred greater
criticism of the launch agreements.22 '
1. An Overview of The Launch Agreement Debate
Controversy over the launch agreements is polarizing the respec-
tive commercial space interests of the satellite and launch vehicle in-
dustries.222 Greater launcher availability benefits the satellite industry
218. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88 (collecting a variety of
criticisms of the space launch agreements); supra note 137 and accompanying text
(citing Rep. Weldon's view that the space launch agreements serve to frustrate the
Clinton Administration's space commercialization policy).
219. See id; 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D.
Dailey, Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-
Martin Corp.) (arguing against restrictions placed on Russian launch vehicles); id.
at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.) (arguing for more restrictions on non-market economy launch
providers); 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32 (testimony of Steven D.
Dorfman, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (arguing against restrictions
on non-market economy launch providers).
220. See 1988 Space Roundtable, supra note 39 (debating whether the pricing
and quota provision strategies in the space launch agreements really serve the
goals of promoting United States commercial interests in the satellite and launch
service industries).
221. See Randy Ridley, The Battle for the Launch Pad, SATELLITE COMM., June
1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 13599777 (implying that the growing market for
space launch vehicles has lead to increased criticisms of the trade agreements); The
Launch Market in '94 and Beyond, SATELLITE NEWS, Jan. 3, 1994, available in
1994 WL 2458886 (stating that increasingly crowded launch manifests have lead
to sharper industry complaints of the limits placed on less expensive and available
non-market economy launch vehicles).
222. Compare 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57-58 (testimony
of Steven D. Dorfnan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (stating that
launch quotas should be lifted) with 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (tes-
timony of Stanely Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas
Corp.) (arguing that launch quotas should be enforced).
[13:157
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH SERVICEs
in terms of cost,' capacity,22 and scheduling of launch vehicles,'
but forces the United States launch services industry to compete di-
rectly with government-subsidized competitors.226 Despite efforts to
reach acceptable compromise, an industry consensus regarding the
agreements has not been forthcoming. The satellite industry sees
them as overly protective of Western launch providers, 7 while the
launch service industry desires greater protections.'
The launch and satellite industry do share some common com-
plaints. First, the distinctions that the agreements draw between LEO
and GEO launch pricing and quota provisions ultimately manipulate
and distort market forces in these distinctive markets. 9 Second, both
223. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfman, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (stating that by offering a
wider choice in launch vehicles, satellite customers can seek out the best prices);
id at 64 (testimony of Robert E. Berry, President Space Systems/Loral) (stating
that in order to lower costs for placing a satellite into orbit, the satellite industry
needs to not only lower costs for satellites, but for launch vehicles as well).
224. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (stating that satellite customers need greater launch vehicle capacity).
225. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfinan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (stating that the unreli-
ability of launch vehicles requires satellite customers to spread out launches on
multiple launch vehicles).
226. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner,
Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (stating that by
lifting launch quotas and price restraints, the launch industry is forced to compete
with non-market providers using unlimited government resources).
227. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 64 (testimony of Robert
E. Berry, President Space Systems/Loral) (stating that the United States policies
are too protective of the launch industry as they reduce incentives for cost reduc-
tions and developments in new technologies).
228. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88 (opening statement of Rep. Dave
Weldon, Chairman of House Space and Aeronautics Subcomm.) (stating that the
pricing provisions should be more strictly enforced).
229. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of R.
Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp.) (stating, from the perspective of a
launch service provider of LEO satellites, that non-market economies should be
held to the same pricing and quota provisions in the LEO market as in the GEO
market); id at 57 (testimony of Steven D. Dorfman, Pres., Telecomm. and Space
Sector, GMH) (stating, from the perspective of a satellite manufacturer, that the
LEO/GEO distinctions should be eliminated as they distort supply and demand).
But see id at 72 (statement of Bary Bertiger, Corporate Vice Pres. and Assistant
General Manager, Satellite Communications Division of Motorola) (stating, from
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parties claim that quota provisions will quickly become unmanage-
able in the face of an increasing number of international launch
service providers.2 30 Third, although the launch agreements manifest
a goal of establishing a "level playing field,"23' they fail to control
the business practices of Arianespace--the United States' biggest
competitor in launch services.123 These multi-faceted set of criticisms
suggest that the growing market in space launch services may render
the launch agreement's as an impractical, ineffective and counterac-
tive trade instrument of the United States. 233
the perspective of a satellite manufacturer and operator, that the LEO market is too
uncertain to allow effective pricing and quota provisions like those in the GEO
market). GEO pricing and quota provisions are far more specific, see discussion,
supra Part III.C.3 (describing provisions for GEO launches), than LEO pricing and
launch restrictions. See discussion, supra Part III.C.4 (describing provisions for
LEO launches).
230. See 1996SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (arguing that in addition to the adverse effects on the satellite industry, the
United States cannot maintain quotas against China and the Russian Federation
when the industry is facing new competitors in Japan, Brazil, and India).
231. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 48 (testimony of Donald W. Eiss,
United States Trade Representative for Industry, and Catherine Novelli, Deputy
Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern Central Europe and Eura-
sia) (stating that the space launch agreements are intended to provide a free and
fair trading environment).
232. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D. Dailey,
Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-Martin
Corp.) (stating that the United States should focus its efforts on controlling Ari-
anespace's unfair trade practices). Lockheed-Martin is a longtime bitter rival of
Arianespace. See generally Tim Furniss, Bigot's Battle, FLIGHT INT'L, Aug. 2,
1995, available in 1995 WL 12266775 (responding to Lockheed-Martin's chal-
lenge to take away Arianespace's market share, Charles Bigot of Arianespace
comments, "[c]ompetition is competition, that's fine, but the aggressive tone of
ILS is uncalled for. We don't want a war, but, when a giant like Lockheed Martin
is capable of such a tone, it augers for quite a battle in the future"); Restrictions
Sought by Lockheed Aren't Needed or Appropriate, Bigot Says, SATELLITE WK.,
Oct. 3, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8734091 (responding to Lockheed's com-
plaints against Arianespace's highly subsidized launch service, Bigot defends Ari-
anespace's subsidies, arguing that Lockheed benefits from similar subsidies in the
United States).
233. See, e.g., supra note 137 (citing congressional criticism of the launch
agreements).
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2. Difficulties in Applying the Pricing Guidelines
Ideally, the cost guidelines manifest a means for facilitating a tran-
sition to market principles" and effectively monitoring compli-
ance.235 Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to make one-to-one
comparisons, or derive a "fair trade" standard for trade in launch
services." Ultimately, the pricing guidelines may be unenforceable,
even irrelevant in the larger marketplace.
United States Trade Representatives attest to the great difficulties
in obtaining the costs incurred with a launch services offering
price. 7 The required information is simply not being provided.
Moreover, United States companies are usually hesitant to provide
any detailed information on contract costs. 8 But this refusal to pro-
vide business costs, to provide the highly sensitive information that
may affect a competitive position in the marketplace is expected.239
However, without a comprehensive comparison of costs, the Sub-
234. See 1993 Russia Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. I ; 1995 China
Agreement, supra note 9, art. I ; 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art.
I.
235. See discussion, supra Part HI.C.3 (discussing the monitoring and enforce-
ment strategies of the monitoring Subcommittee).
236. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 50 (statement of Catherine
Novelli, Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern Central
Europe and Eurasia) (arguing that comparing launch bids is very complicated be-
cause there are other considerations besides the offering price); supra notes 177-
180 and accompanying text (discussing the need to resort to non-price factors
when a contract bid falls below a fifteen percent threshold).
237. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 50 (statement of Catherine
Novelli, Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern / Central
Europe and Eurasia) (noting that China has been reluctant to provide cost infor-
mation); discussion, supra Part III.B.3 and accompanying text (discussing re-
quirements for data exchanges).
238. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 50 (statement of Catherine
Novelli, Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern Central
Europe and Eurasia) (noting that the cost comparisons are further complicated by
the fact that United States launch providers often provide their cost information in
only summary form).
239. The information disclosures required by the launch agreements often in-
volve exchanges of confidential business practices. Although the purpose of an in-
formation disclosure is to ensure a fair trading environment, a business would be
reluctant to risk an information "leak" to a competitor during intergovernmental
negotiations.
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committee cannot clearly ascertain whether or not the contract price
is justified.
Even if all business information were fully disclosed, the Sub-
committee would still be challenged with making one-to-one com-
parisons of non-market and Western launcher costs. First, Western
labor and material costs differ from those in the non-market na-
tions.24 ° If labor and material costs were the sole criterion, non-
market contractors would drastically underbid Western providers.24'
Second, there is no ready way to compare "Western-type" govern-
ment subsidies with non-market country subsidies.242 On the one
hand, Western launch providers will claim that China's centralized
economy internalizes costs that Western launch providers must re-
cover in contract prices.243 On the other hand, the Chinese and Rus-
240. See SN Newsmaker Interview: A Talk with ASIA SAT'S Terry Seldon,
SATELLITE NEWS, Dec. 7, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2611622 [hereinafter
ASIASAT's Terry Seldon] (discussing relatively low Chinese labor costs); Great
Wall's Government Backing Depends on Aggressive Marketing, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Sept. 3, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2305740 [hereinafter GWIC Strategy]
(describing China's centralized economy, government support of GWIC, and low
labor costs); 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner,
Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (stating how the
Chinese and Russian economies differ from the West).
241. See ASIASAT's Terry Seldon, supra note 240 (arguing that requiring an
"on par" cost with Western launch services is useless because the Chinese do not
price labor and material in the same manner as the West).
242. Compare 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely
Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (stating
how the non-market nations are unconstrained by real costs due to substantial gov-
ernment support and a centralized economy), with id. at 88 (testimony of Brian D.
Dailey, Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-
Martin Corp.) (stating how Arianespace, a Western launch service provider, is the
most subsidized launch service provider in the world), and X33 Testimony, supra
note 104, at 59 (statement of Ray A. Williamson, Senior Research Scientist, Space
Policy Institute) (arguing that the United States launch industry requires govern-
ment fimancing for the next generation launch vehicle), and Furniss, supra note
232, at 1 (quoting Arianespace's Bigot) (indicating that the United States' huge
investment in the next generation launch vehicle will result in increased govern-
ment support for Arianespace) and Anthony L. Velocci, Atlas 2AR Forms Core of
Launcher Strategy, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 6, 1995, available in
1995 WL 10193122 (describing how Lockheed-Martin's investment in Russian
engine technology will most likely lead to increased government subsidies for Ari-
anespace).
243. See id. (testimony of Stanely Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations
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sian governments cannot offer their launch providers the vast number
of government satellite launch contracts which the United States re-
serves for its launch providers.2 "
Notwithstanding the goals of ensuring that a contract price actu-
ally reflects the real costs or is "on par" with Western trade prac-
tices, the reviewing agency must consider factors which place non-
market launch providers at a fundamental disadvantage in the West-
ern marketplace."4 Satellites launched on Western launch vehicles
are not encumbered by stringent technology control plans24 and ex-
port licensing processes. 7 China, Russia, and Ukraine, therefore,
need to charge substantially less for their launches because few, if
any, customers would pay Western prices for the higher costs associ-
ated with launch integration, launch support and restricted East-West
technology exchanges.24' Although Russian booster technology is
considered as advanced as in the West,249 political risks," ° cash-flow
McDonnell Douglas Corp).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2465 (d) (1994) (stating that NASA satellite launches are
restricted to United States launch services); Smith, supra note 20 (stating that the
United States' policy towards launches of government satellites has been a fre-
quent source of criticism by launch competitors).
245. See GWIC Strategy, supra note 240, at 3 (stating that GWIC needs to offer
low prices in order to attract customers); supra note 177 (describing the various
non-cost factors justifying a lower contract bid, including barriers to technology
exchanges, export restrictions, and the increased launch and integration costs asso-
ciated with launch facilities in China and Russia).
246. See SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 48 (statement of Donald W. Eiss,
United States Trade Representative for Industry) (noting that the differences in
cost associated with export restrictions and transportation also need to be included
in contract price comparison); supra note 206 (describing the burdensome re-
quirements imposed by technology control plans).
247. See discussion, supra Part III.C.5 (discussing requirements for technology
control plans before export licenses are issued; the process of evaluating export
licenses on a "case-by-case" basis; and the State Department's control over export
licenses).
248. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (stating that the non-price fac-
tors can negate cost advantages in choosing a Chinese or Russian launch vehicle).
249. See discussion, supra Part I.D (discussing Western concern over the poten-
tial for Russia's rocket fleet in the early 1990s).
250. See Special Report-Profits, Pitfalls of U.S.-Russian Space Ventures,
SATELLITE NEWs, July 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5914622 (listing the nu-
merous barriers inhibiting Russian competitiveness). The study found that the po-
tential barriers to Russia's entry into Western market includes technical risks asso-
ciated with integrating Western-Russian space technologies, Russian military
1997] 201
AM. U INT' L. REV.
problems,25' and launch facility problems252 make the Russian launch
provider less attractive to customers. In short, there are a variety of
factors justifying an aggressive contract price. What would be seen,
at first blush, as predatory prices253 may, in reality, be the only means
for competing in the marketplace.
These non-cost factors have allowed Chinese and Russian launch
service providers to charge less for satellite launches.25 4 The major
influence of these non-cost factors is evidenced by the fact that no
such contract has ever met the fifteen percent pricing thresholdY.2 5 If
a pricing guideline is ever followed, will it serve the purpose of
reaching an open-trading environment in space launch vehicles? The
question is, therefore, not whether non-cost factors justify non-
market country underbidding, but whether the terms of the agree-
ments216 serve the goals of encouraging Western trade practices.
The myriad of factors that influence access to the Western launch
market, and lack of candor in the negotiation process, suggest that
the compliance provisions in the launch agreement provisions offer
actions undermining economic and political stability, crime, corruption and cul-
tural barriers. See id. at 1-2.
251. See id.
252. See U.S. Firm Says Baikonur Improving Slowly, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2237817 (describing the deteriorated
conditions at the Russia's Baikonur launch facility).
253. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner,
Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (arguing that
non-market nations are ignoring the pricing guidelines and engaging in predatory
pricing strategies at the expense of Western launch service competitors who have
to recover costs in contract prices).
254. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 48 (testimony of Donald W. Eiss,
United States Trade Rep. for Industry and Labor, and Catherine Novelli, Deputy
Assistant United States Trade Representative for Eastern / Central Europe and
Eurasia) (justifying United States approval of lower contract prices due to non-cost
factors).
255. See SLA Hearing, supra note 85, at 173 (opening statement of Rep.
Weldon) (asserting that no non-market country launch provider has thus far shown
a willingness to abide by the cost provisions). The 15% threshold raises a pre-
sumption of whether the bidder is participating in predatory pricing strategies. See
discussion, supra Part III.C.3 and accompanying notes (describing the Subcom-
mittee monitoring functions).
256. 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1; 1993 Russia Trade
Agreement, supra note 7, art. I; 1995 China Agreement, supra note 9, art. I.
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little guidance to the Subcommittee.2" Without a more comprehen-
sive set of trade rules, the monitoring authority will be forced to deal
with uncertainties in an ad-hoc manner258 Trade restrictions will
continue to depend on "closed-door" government assessments of
compliance, involving certain "guess-work" on whether a given
contract bid is fair or reasonable. Under the current environment, a
more open exchange seems unlikely. Perhaps an information ex-
change through a neutral third party259 would better address the need
for preventing disruption during this transitional period"1 in the
space launch services market.
3. Quantitative Limits (Quotas)
Quantitative limits are by far the most contentious issue sur-
rounding the launch agreements.261 By restricting the number of non-
Western launches, the United States is directly protecting Western
launch vehicle market share.262 On the other hand, the quotas serve to
257. See discussion, supra Part III.B.1-3 (describing a treaty procedure whereby
the Subcommittee reviews questionable launch bids by resorting to negotiations,
suggesting that there is a certain lack of rules to be followed).
258. See discussion, supra Part III.B.1-3 (suggesting that the resolution of ques-
tionable market bids are ultimately reviewed on a case-by-case basis by resorting
to non-price factors arising from the launch vehicle mission requirements and the
services provided to the launch customer).
259. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of R.
Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp.) (arguing that compliance with the
data exchange requirements in the agreements could be better accomplished if an
international clearinghouse entity, consisting of participating governments and in-
dustries, was established to independently review the relevant data).
260. See generally The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-657, § 9, 102 Stat. 3900 (endorsing negotiated trade in space
launch services as a means for transitioning to a set of multilateral trading rules).
261. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian
D. Dailey, Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lock-
heed-Martin Corp.) (focusing criticism on the agreements, Dailey stated that the
United States trade policy is "synonymous with one word: quota"); 1994 Global
Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven D. Dorfinan, Pres., Tele-
comm. and Space Sector, GMH) (focusing criticism on the launch quotas).
262. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner,
Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (explaining how
McDonnell Douglas requires restrictions on non-market nation launchers in order
to recover costs associated with development of the Delta III heavy launch vehi-
cle).
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hinder United States satellite competitiveness.263
The current launch agreements contain provisions for increasing
launch quotas, depending on three and four year projections of
launch demand.26 While it might seem relatively straightforward to
allot the requisite number of launch vehicles based on Western
launch vehicle availability, the realities of the commercial space
launch market suggest that the quota-system is deficient in many re-
spects. First, the practice of buying up multiple launch options in or-
der to spread out launch failure risks26 does not fit neatly into the
quota allotment strategy. Second, satellite contracts will often hinge
on which launch vehicle can be contracted. 6 Third, quotas restrict
the ability of satellite customers to search-out the best price for
launch services.267
Quotas are based on Subcommittee assessments of five-year mar-
ket demand projections which estimate the number of launches and
then compares these launches to the availability of Western launch
vehicles.26' The problem is that satellite manufacturers book more
263. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 72 (statement of Bary
Bertiger, Corporate Vice Pres. and Assistant General Manager, Satellite Commu-
nications Division of Motorola) (stating how the quotas force satellite customers to
pay the higher costs for Western launch vehicles); 1994 Global Trade Hearing,
supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven D. Dorfnan, Pres., Telecomm. and
Space Sector, GMH) (arguing that the agreements force the satellite industry to
subsidize United States launch providers).
264. 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (1); 1993 Russia
Trade Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV (1)-(2) ; 1995 China Agreement, supra
note 9, arts. IV (2)-(4).
265. See discussion, supra Part II.C (discussing market strategies for dealing
with launch vehicle reliability).
266. See discussion, supra Part II.B (describing the interests shared by the pur-
chaser of a satellite and the launch service provider, the interests being linked by a
joint ownership in the satellite communications venture).
267. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfnan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (stating that by limiting
the use of non-market nations launch vehicles, the launch agreements are prevent-
ing satellite companies from seeking out the lowest cost-to-orbit); id, at 72 (state-
ment of Bary Bertiger, Corporate Vice Pres. and Assistant General Manager, Sat-
ellite Communications Division of Motorola) (asserting that by restricting access
to foreign launch vehicles, the United States government is controlling satellite
costs).
268. See supra note 162 (discussing the use of market forecasts to evaluate sup-
ply and demand).
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than one launch vehicle to cover launch failures and delays.269 The
Subcommittee recognizes the need to spread risks.270 However,
placing the availability of launch vehicles in the hands of the gov-
ernment does little to satisfy business needs in a competitive envi-
ronment. Industry wants to make its own risk assessment; they do not
want to leave the decision making up to government market analysts.
Satellite manufacturers have to respond to customer preferences in
launch vehicles. Imposing quotas on the Russian Proton could jeop-
ardize the United States bids on an INMARSAT21 ' satellite contract
because Russia shares in this satellite consortium.2n  Similarly,
IRIDIUM2" satellite launches will sometimes prefer Chinese
launches because of China's market share in IRIDIUM.274 If China
and Russia reach their launch limits, United States satellite compa-
nies could lose out on these contracts.
Satellite contracts usually include costs for launch vehicles.2"' By
limiting the choices of launch vehicles, satellite manufacturers are
forced to pay Western prices. Thus, while satellite manufacturers
have control over their costs for production and maintenance, the
costs for launch vehicles are, arguably, controlled by the United
269. See discussion, supra Part II.C (discussing market strategies for dealing
with launch vehicle reliability).
270. See 1995 China Guidelines, supra note 157, at 20,798 (stating that the
needs to minimize risk are considered in launch quotas).
271. See supra note 77 (describing the INMARSAT satellite consortium).
272. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (implying that Russia's part
ownership in INMARSAT forces satellite companies competing for INMARSAT
satellite contracts to use Russian launch vehicles).
273. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 72 (statement of Bary
Bertiger, Corporate Vice Pres. and Assistant General Manager, Satellite Commu-
nications Division of Motorola) (describing Motorola's mobile communication
system known as IRIDIUM).
274. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (implying that China's invest-
ment in IRIDIUM will keep GWIC launch services in the satellite launch market);
1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 72 (statement of Bary Bertiger,
Corporate Vice Pres. and Assistant General Manager, Satellite Communications
Division of Motorola) (arguing that quotas are not wise for LEO satellite launches
as the IRIDIUM system is multinational in nature and requires cooperation in
launch vehicle services with countries like China).
275. See discussion, supra Part II.A-B (discussing market practices whereby
customers buy both the satellite and launch vehicle).
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States government.276 But one must remember that United States in-
terest in restricting non-market nations access to the Western launch
services market serves two purposes: (1) preventing disruption to the
Western trading environment where the rules of the market prices are
difficult to apply via treaty,27 and (2) protecting the Western market
during this transitional period27 where the United States launch
services industry cannot survive through private investment alone
279
and the government maintains strong interests in access to space.280 It
can be argued that the launch agreement quota system is a govern-
ment subsidy alternative to direct investment.2 ' Although United
States government investment in launch vehicle technologies contin-
ues,282 launch vehicle advocates still believe that more government
support is needed. 3
276. See supra note 267 (providing arguments that the United States govern-
ment controls the cost of launch vehicles).
277. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Eiss, Deputy
Ass't USTR for Industry) (noting that the use of quotas in conjunction with pricing
guidelines is the only reliable framework in which "business plans can be devel-
oped and executed").
278. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Stanely Ebner,
Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (arguing that the
private investments by McDonnell Douglas in the Delta III launch vehicle can be
recovered so long as the United States maintains quotas against the non-market
economy launch vehicle suppliers).
279. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian
D. Dailey, Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lock-
heed-Martin Corp.) (arguing that the space launch services industry's traditional
reliance on government support must be continued).
280. See discussion, supra Part L.A (outlining governmental interests in space
launch vehicles).
281. See supra note 263 (implying that a market subsidy is employed by using
quotas). But see supra discussion Part III.D.2 and note 277 (implying that quotas
are needed in a market where it is very difficult to establish pricing rules).
282. See X33 Testimony, supra note 104, at 59 (statement of Ray A. William-
son, Senior Research Scientist, Space Policy Institute). See generally 1996 SLA
Hearing, supra note 88 (statements of Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator and Rob-
ert Davis, Undersecretary for Space for the Department of Defense) (detailing the
current government investment programs in new launch vehicle technologies and
launch facilities).
283. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 96 (testimony of Sta-
nely Ebner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (ar-
guing that the increase in the launch agreement quotas in recent years jeopardizes
the McDonnell Douglas investment in the Delta III program); id, at 28 (testimony
of Mr. Robert Davis, Deputy Undersecretary for Space, Dept. of Defense) (taking
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4. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Satellite Market
Criticisms of pricing and quota provisions have reached a high
point since the early 1990s when the first proposals were made for
launching LEO communication satellite constellations.2" The rela-
tively matured GEO are more predictable in terms of launch mani-
fests, costs, and availability;285 however, the uncertain requirements
of future LEO constellations may make an effective implementation
of the flexible quota strategy impossible.286
There are two difficulties with the current LEO quota guidelines.
First, the quotas suggest that the use of non-market nations launch
providers might increase with LEO satellite launches.2 Second, the
LEO guidelines potentially threaten the viability of those satellite
constellations which depend heavily on world-wide participation.2
These criticisms highlight the re-occurring conflicts of interest be-
tween the launch services industry and the satellite industry.289 On
the one hand, is the United States space launch vehicle industry still
exception with the rising quotas for non-market country providers who are under-
bidding Western providers).
284. See Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, 5 Year Outlook. Space Steady Growth Seen for
Commercial Space, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., March 15, 1993, available in
1993 WL 2622882 (discussing proposals for large-scale LEO satellite constella-
tions).
285. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of Don-
ald Phillips, Ass't United States Trade Representative for Industry).
286. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (suggesting that the LEO provi-
sions could be eliminated if industry decides to pursue large scale LEO satellite
constellations).
287. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 121 (testimony of R.
Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp.) (stating that traditionally, United
States launch providers captured 80% or more market share; however, this number
could fall to a level well below 50% in the late 1990s if the Russians are uncon-
strained).
288. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 57 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfinan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH).
289. See discussion, supra Part III.D.I (summarizing the conflicts of interests
between launch service providers and the satellite industry). Spokespersons for
United States commercial spaceports have voiced criticized the launch agreements
as well. 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88 (statement of Donald D. Smith, Execu-
tive Director of the Western Commercial Launch Space Center) (arguing that the
LEO provisions should not allow non-market nations to gain up to 50% market
share in a business where United States launch facilities compete for launch serv-
ices).
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in need of the government protections, or subsidies, provided by
quotas where comprehensive trading rules for investors have yet to
evolve? On the other hand, how can the United States best formulate
a strategy which does not hinder the growth and development of the
commercial satellite market in which its own satellite industry is a
major player?
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS / CONCLUSIONS
International policies depend on trust and good-faith efforts when
reaching trade agreements. The United States must always take a
vigilant stand against trading environments which threaten strategic
industries like the space launch vehicle industry.29 The launch
agreements serve these goals, however, change is needed when once-
needed government policies begin to run counter to changing eco-
nomic environments by removing incentives to invest in new tech-
nologies and threatening United States market share. The time is ripe
for replacing negotiated trade protectionism in the commercial space
launch market with a belief that the United States launch services in-
dustry can sustain a major market share and compete in a more open
trading environment.
A. AN END TO LAUNCH QUOTAS
The United States can relax the overt discriminatory effects of
launch quotas on non-market nations without risk of destabilizing the
United States commercial launch services industry. The past eight
years demonstrate China's limited potential for disrupting the West-
ern market, 91 integration of Russian and Ukrainian launch vehicles
with Western suppliers,292 and an increasing dependence on Western
290. See generally Military Space Power, supra note 29 (collecting testimony
regarding how the commercial space sector, and in particular the launch services
industry, pose challenges that implicate national security, foreign policy, military,
and economic policy interests).
291. See generally discussion, supra Part I.B (describing China's unimpressive
entry into the launch services market).
292. See supra notes 87-89 (describing joint ventures between the West and
Ukrainian and Russian launch providers).
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support by China,293 Russia,9 4 and the Ukraine.29' These trends sug-
gest that none of these launch suppliers will fare well in the Western
marketplace unless there is more cooperation with the West. In short,
arguments supporting the necessity of using quotas as a means for
preventing disruption to Western markets are becoming less tenable.
China's launch program has yet to show the potential to capture a
larger percentage of the launch services market. China's launch
services industry cannot, in the near term,296 offer the reliability and
capacity of Western providers.297 Without a technological or eco-
nomic capability to compete with Western providers, policymakers
should reconsider whether quotas on Chinese launch vehicles are un-
necessarily blocking commercial opportunities for United States
business. In 1989, no one knew China's potential in the launch serv-
293. See supra note 61(discussing China's desire to seek out greater cooperation
with the West in light of its failing launch services program).
294. See Janet Guyon & Betsy McKay, Aerospace: Russia's Rocket Makers
Seek Cash Boot, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJA
12473310 (discussing how Russia relies on financial support from the west in or-
der to maintain its space program).
295. See Joseph C. Anselmo, Russia Pushes for Bigger Launch Market Share,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7631050
(stating how the problems at the Baikonur launch facility and cash flow problems
in Russia effect equally Ukraine's launch services potential because the two coun-
tries are economically linked).
296. The author does not wish to speculate on China's potential in space launch
services in ten years. The issues surrounding this topic are well beyond the scope
of this piece. This author merely asserts that China cannot compete with Western
providers in today's marketplace.
297. China has not captured a larger market share for three reasons: (1) inferior
launch vehicle technology compared to the West, see Furniss, supra note 208 (dis-
cussing the number of Long March launch failures and noting that even in the best
of times, China could not compete with the Western providers because it lacks the
launch vehicle capacity); (2) a reluctance to disclose information following launch
failures, see Special Report, supra note 99 (discussing China's refusal to disclose
information regarding a launch failure, causing customers and insurers to turn
away from Chinese launch services); Hughes Discusses 3rd Chinese Satellite
Launch as Optus B-2 Probe Continues, SATELLITE WK., Feb. 15, 1993, available
in 1993 WL 2613800 (discussing possible reasons for the first Optus-2 launch
failure, adding that China is unwilling to disclose details of possible launch vehicle
problems); and (3) loss of life, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text
(noting that loss of life resulting from Chinese launch failures have caused satellite
customers to seek launch services elsewhere).
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ices market.298 The parties imposed quotas as a protective measure
for Western launch competitors.299 Now, the world market views
China's poor launch record and protective strategies as unaccept-
able,"0 demonstrated by an exodus of customers and a diminishing
number of insurance providers.30 ' These developments force a con-
clusion that China cannot, in the near term, achieve a more signifi-
cant market share through predatory pricing.
Prior to the 1993 Russia Agreement, the West voiced strong con-
cerns over the potential effect of Russia's entry in the launch services
market.302 Now, the failing Russian and Ukrainian space infrastruc-
tures30 3 suggests that these once ominous launch vehicle providers3"
cannot dictate their own rules for the market.3 5 As a result, Russia
and Ukraine have become increasingly dependent on Western sup-
port.306 Fears of dumping low-cost launch vehicles on the world-
markee 7 are simply not as prevalent as they once were.308 Although
298. See 1988 Space Roundtable, supra note 39.
299. See 1989 China Agreement, supra note 37, art. IV.
300. See supra note 297 (summarizing the reasons why China has not gained
significant market share).
301. See supra discussion Part I.B (discussing China's dwindling market in re-
cent years).
302. See discussion, supra Part I.D and accompanying text (discussing Russia's
advanced technology and large arsenal of launch vehicles with proven capabili-
ties).
303. See supra note 250 (discussing Russia's problems with crime, corruption
and cash flow).
304. See discussion, supra Part I.D (stating that Russia possessed advanced
booster technology).
305. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (stating that the financial crisis
and political risks in Russia have limited their competitiveness in the launch serv-
ices market).
306. See supra notes 294 and 295.
307. See 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 98-99 (testimony of Stanely Eb-
ner, Senior Vice Pres., Wash. Operations McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (criticizing
the administration's failure to enforce the pricing provisions and requesting en-
forcement of the quota provisions due to the potential of non-market providers to
flood the market with low-cost launch vehicles); 1994 Global Trade Hearing, su-
pra note 32, at 121 (testimony of R. Grabe, Vice President Orbital Sciences Corp.)
(asking that the LEO restrictions be modified to further limit non-market country
participation).
308. See discussion, supra Part I.D (discussing Western reaction to the former
Soviet launch providers entry into the launch services market in the early 1990s).
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a relaxation of Russian launch quotas would threaten some Western
launch providers,3"9 a more open market for ex-soviet launch vehicles
will afford United States satellite providers the same opportunities as
foreign competitors.1 Moreover, a relaxation of quotas would ar-
guably promote more favorable market transitioning mechanisms
such as the formation ofjoint ventures3 ' in launch services.
The launch agreements depend on market forecasts to implement
the quota strategy."' The strategy is at best marginally acceptable to
today's GEO launch vehicle customers, but the LEO strategy" 3 has
little, if any, support in the industry." 4 More importantly, the Russia,
Ukraine, and China quotas will have little effect when countries like
Japan, Brazil, and India3 " begin to gain market share. Rather than
supporting launch quotas, the United States should place more faith
in the resilience and competitiveness of the United States launch in-
dustry.
Launch quotas can only hurt the satellite industry. The interna-
tional telecommunications market requires diversity in launch vehi-
cles.3"6 The United States satellite industry cannot continue to subsi-
309. When one views quotas as a government subsidy, it follows that the elimi-
nation of quotas will affect some Western launch providers even if a level playing
field were to exist.
310. See discussion, supra Part II.B (describing how access to launch vehicles
effects market share in the satellite industry); discussion, supra Part III.D.3 (dis-
cussing how quotas serve to limit opportunities for United States satellite indus-
tries).
311. See supra notes 87-89 (listing the joint ventures formed between Russian,
Ukrainian, European and United States Aerospace companies).
312. See supra note 162 (discussing the Subcommittee's use of market forecasts
to assure that there is an adequate supply of launch vehicles).
313. See discussion, supra Part llI.C.4 (discussing the Subcommittee's means
for evaluating participation in the LEO market where uncertainties in demand do
not allow for fixed quotas).
314. See discussion, supra Part III.D. 1 (discussing both launch vehicle and sat-
ellite industry criticisms of the launch agreement's distinctions drawn between
LEO and GEO launches); discussion, supra Part 11I.D.3-4 (discussing the argu-
ments lodged against the trade agreement restrictions in the LEO market)
315. See generally 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 90 (statement of Brian
D. Dailey, Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corp.) (stating that the current quota
system applys only to Russia, Ukraine and China).
316. See generally discussion, supra Part II.A-C (describing the needs of the
satellite industry in a world market); discussion, supra Part III.D (discussing how
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dize Western launchers by limiting launches on non-Western launch
vehicles" 7 if it is to remain competitive. Satellite planners need to be
able to choose the least expensive launcher and make their own as-
sessments of launch vehicle needs." 8 The United States communica-
tions satellite industry is ten-times larger than the United States
launch services industry.1 9 The United States should act now by rea-
ligning its trade policies to better reflect the larger needs of the
commercial space industry.
B. MARKET REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL
SPACE INDUSTRY
Protectionism breeds complacency in an industry where techno-
logical innovation has stagnated32 ° and increased demand increases
costs.32" ' When governments restrict access to the foreign satellite
launch market, the domestic launch industry has less incentive to cut
costs and advance technology.322 Though relaxing protective mecha-
nisms may impose hardships on the lesser established United States
launch providers, a government's commitment to invest in launch
vehicle technologies323 offers a more harmonizing and economically
more beneficial alternative for the future. If the optimistic goals in
space commercialization are reachable in the next century, 34 greater
quotas restrict the satellite industry).
317. See generally discussion, supra Part III.D.3 (explaining how quotas force
the satellite industry to use Western launch vehicles when less expensive alterna-
tives are available).
318. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 58 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfman, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH).
319. See id, at57.
320. See generally 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 53 (testimony
of Steven D. Dorfnan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (noting that the
United States launch fleet is over thirty years old).
321. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (implying that poor launch ve-
hicle reliability has raised the costs of insuring satellites).
322. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 58 (testimony of Steven
D. Dorfnan, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (arguing that placing an
artificial floor on Western launch provider market share gives the industry little
incentive to invest in new technologies and cut costs).
323. See discussion, supra note 282 (discussing current investments in launch
vehicle technology).
324. See Robert S. Walker, To Expand Frontier in Space, Embrace Open Mar-
ket on Earth, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Oct. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 12332387
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incentives for improving United States launch vehicle capabilities
and nurturing market-orientated competitiveness must start now.
A successful transition to a market-orientated trade environment
will depend on whether nations can reach a consensus on trading
rules despite a continuing need for government financial support.3"
Efforts at achieving a multilateral trading regime in an industry
which relies heavily on government support structures has not been
successful in the past.326 Any renewed effort will be slow to imple-
ment due to the very nature of government interests in space launch
vehicles" 7 and the cost requirements of launching satellites into
space. The difficulties in enforcing the launch agreement price provi-
sions demonstrates these conflicting national interests.3'28 In the likely
event that a multilateral trade regime is slow to develop, the United
States should pursue alternative means for enforcing pricing guide-
lines. Monitoring should not depend on "equitable" decisions
reached by closed-door, inter-governmental consultations.329 More
transparent review processes are suggested as a means for restoring
(stating that by 2015, space products and services will become an irreplaceable
part of everyday life).
325. Government investment in space launch vehicles will continue for some
time to come. See 1994 Global Trade Hearing, supra note 32, at 53 (testimony of
Steven D. Dorfman, Pres., Telecomm. and Space Sector, GMH) (arguing that the
United States government needs to support the development of launch vehicle
technologies); 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 88 (testimony of Brian D.
Dailey, Vice Pres., Bus. Develop. Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Lockheed-
Martin Corp.) (advocating government support in launch vehicle development);
1996 SLA Hearing, supra note 88, at 48 (statement of Donald W. Eiss) (stating
that government investment in launch vehicles is an integral part of United States
Space Policy).
326. See discussion, supra Part I.C (discussing the failed attempt at reaching a
trading consensus with the Europeans in the 1990 "Rules of The Road" talks).
327. See discussion, supra Part L.A (discussing how national security, political
and economic interests of governments are linked to a space launch vehicle capa-
bility); discussion Part H.B (stating that government interests in launch vehicles
preclude wholly private investors from competing in space launch services).
328. See discussion, supra Part III.D.2 (arguing that industry-wide government
subsidies complicate the enforcement of pricing provisions); supra, note 232 and
accompanying text (noting the strong criticisms exchanged between Arianespace
and ILS in light of the difficulties of enforcing pricing guidelines).
329. See discussion, supra Part IIl.B.2-3 and accompanying notes (demonstrat-
ing how questionable contract bids are resolved by comparing non-price factors
and engaging in inter-governmental consultations to determine whether the con-
tract bid is "fair").
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confidence in the negotiation process. 31° Notwithstanding the certain
obstacles preventing a more open disclosure of costs in a competitive
business environment,33' the United States should consider whether
placing authority in an international review committee332 might alle-
viate some of the antagonism which arises during exchanges of in-
formation between governments with direct ties to launch service
providers.
New hope exists for reaching a multilateral trading consensus in
the commercial launch services industry. International cooperation in
the industry is now far more prevalent than in past years.333 In 1990,
the "Rules of the Road" talks between the United States and the
European Community 3 4 were most likely unsuccessful because Ari-
anespace was unwilling to jeopardize its fifty percent share.335 Now,
the coming glut in launch vehicles 336 and increasing United States
market share337 is convincing the Europeans to begin replacing con-
frontation with cooperation.338 If these once bitter rivals33 9 can coop-
330. See discussion, supra Part III.B.2 and accompanying text (arguing that the
Subcommittee engages in guesswork and behind the scenes trade-offs to determine
whether non-market nation launch service providers are engaging in predatory
practices); supra notes 255 (stating that the Subcommittee has allowed the non-
market launch providers to undercut United States launch providers).
331. See discussion, supra Part III.D.2 (discussing the difficulties in obtaining
outlays justifying contract offering prices).
332. See supra note 259.
333. See Trends in Space Launch Services, supra note 89 (listing joint ventures
in space launch services).
334. See discussion, supra Part I.C.
335. See generally Garcia, supra note 23, at 366 (stating that the reasons why
there was a failure to reach an agreement in the "Rules of The Road" talks are un-
known because the negotiations were secret); Radzanowski and Smith, supra note
20, at 3-4 (arguing that the European's protection of their market share and United
States unwillingness to allow Europe to launch United States government satellites
contributed to the failure to establish a fair agreement in the "Rules of the Road"
talks).
336. See discussion, supra Part II.D (discussing trends in supply and demand in
space launch services).
337. See 1996 Banner Year, supra note 134 (stating that the United States ex-
pects to achieve greater than 50% of the launch services market share in 1997). In
previous years, Arianespace dominated the launch services business. See id.
338. See, e.g., Arianespace Seeks Partners, Plans to Cut Costs by Up to 30%,
WALL ST. J. EuR., Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJE 3804328 (stating
that increased competition has caused the Europeans to seek foreign partners to
214 [13:157
COMMERCIAL SPACE LA UNCH SERVICES
erate, perhaps a multilateral trade regime will soon be possible.
Until recently, no one could predict China's response to its dwin-
dling market share. Would China respond by increasing its predatory
market strategies or increase sales of missile technology to Third
World countries, 40 or would China seek cooperation with the West?
In 1996, China announced that it wished to pursue cooperation with
the West in the form of joint ventures and technology exchanges. 4
China's new reliance on the West suggests that a more open East-
West forum may soon be possible.
Rather than place undue reliance on protective mechanisms at the
expense of promoting "free and open trade,"3 2 the United States
should recognize that more beneficial means now exist for transi-
tioning to a "trade environment characterized by the free and open
interaction of market economies." 3 The trends in today's commer-
cial space marketplace suggest that the participating nations may
now be in a position to begin reaching a consensus on trade in space
launch services.
C. CONCLUSION
Commercial space has evolved from a political-economic based
policy to a policy driven by economic interests. When China was
first allowed into the market, the United States used the launch
agreements as a tool for furthering political interests.' Now, such
use their launch facilities); Bigot Sees Joint Ventures as Alternative to Launch
Shakeout, AEROSPACE DAILY, Oct. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12277488
(stating that a coming glut in launch services will require former competitors to
join forces and enter into joint ventures); Pierre Sparaco, Space Launch Industry
Faces Dramatic Change, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 10850268 (noting that Arianespace's market share is expected to de-
crease from 50% to 21% in the next few years).
339. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the rivalry between
Arianespace and the United States launch service providers).
340. See discussion, supra Part II.B and accompanying notes (explaining how
countries will offset launch vehicles costs by selling missile technology to Third
World countries).
341. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
342. See 1994 Space Policy, supra note 48.
343. Id
344. See discussion, supra Part I.B (arguing that the sanctions imposed on China
were meant to serve political objectives).
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policy decisions increasingly serve economic goals.345
In recent years, the United States has been presented with new and
increasingly more complex346 market developments in commercial
space; market developments which have persuaded policymakers to
revisit 1980s-vintage legislation endorsing regulated trade in com-
mercial space launch vehicles.347 The United States responded to
changing market conditions in 1996 when the 1993 Russia Agree-
ment was amended 34" and a new launch agreement was signed with
the Ukraine. 349 Eight months later, the United States announced that
negotiated trade in space launch services will end after 2001.350 An
end to the launch agreements may occur much sooner.35'
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 will continue to influ-
ence space policy decisions as this legislation is closely tied to very
important governmental interests in space access and dual-use tech-
nology.352 This Comment has attempted to provide an outlay of the
market dynamics in today's international space industry and has con-
cluded that the continued enforcement of market subsides through
launch quotas, although once deemed necessary, are currently more
harmful than beneficial to United States space industries.
Launch quotas no longer serve United States policy goals.353 The
345. See 1994 Space Policy, supra note 48 (stating policy to increase United
States competitiveness in commercial space industry); see also discussion, supra
Part III.A and accompanying notes (describing the purely market-orientated goals
of the Subcommittee).
346. See discussion, supra Parts II.A-D (analyzing the market environment for
commercial space launches); discussion, supra Part III.D (discussing the com-
plexities associated with enforcing the terms of the launch agreements).
347. See Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575, §§ 2, 3,
98 Stat. 3055 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 70101 (1994)).
348. See 1996 Russia Amendment, supra note 7.
349. See 1996 Ukraine Trade Agreement, supra note 8.
350. See 1996 Space Policy, supra note 11.
35 1. See U.S. Considers Unlimited Market Access for Foreign Rockets, MOBILE
COMM. REP., Jan. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8577444 (reporting that there
may be an opportunity to eliminate launch quotas before the expiration of the
agreements; however, countries will first have to show that they have "demon-
strated fair market principles").
352. See discussion, supra Part L.A (discussing governmental interests in sup-
porting a robust launch vehicle industry).
353. See discussion, supra Part I.D (discussing the conflicts between industry
needs in the marketplace and the terms of the trade agreements).
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administration must place more faith in the entrepreneurial resources
of the launch services industry and current investments in launch ve-
hicle technologies." 4 The United States government can no longer
use quotas as a means for controlling foreign participation without
threatening the prosperity of the United States satellite market.
Enormous complexities surround any renewed effort at reaching a
multilateral agreement in the launch vehicle marketplace. 3" The next
stage of negotiations will have to deal with the many governmental
interests in supporting356 and controlling3" the use of space launch
vehicles. Hopefully, the recent trends in the marketplace will enable
governments to reach mutually beneficial agreements and make the
dreams of the next century's commercial space environment"' be-
come a reality.
354. See supra note 282 (discussing current investments in launch vehicle tech-
nology).
355. See discussion, supra Part IV.B and accompanying notes; see also discus-
sion, supra Part II.B and accompanying notes (describing the investment, costs
and government related interests which factor into trade agreements); discussion,
supra Part II.D. I and accompanying notes (discussing the difficulties faced by the
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ernment subsidies needed for the launch industry); 1996 SLA Hearing, supra note
88, at 124 (statement of David Smith, Executive Director of the Western Commer-
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